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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder proposals in corporate America today come in all shapes
and sizes.' Because the shareholder resolution process is fairly simple and
inexpensive, it is an easy way for many large and small investors to have a
voice in corporate governance.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or the "Commission") regulates the shareholder proposal process
through the federal proxy rules.3 These rules have been the subject of nu-
merous amendments and changes in interpretation over time.4 This Com-
ment will focus on one of the ways in which a corporation can exclude a
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would like to thank Professor David Skeel, who continues to demonstrate his enthusiasm for
teaching and genuine care about his students, for his invaluable comments and research ad-
vice; the Investor Responsibility Research Center, for providing the data that gave this Com-
ment its foundation; the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their many
efforts in putting this Comment in order and dedication throughout the year;, and most of all,
my parents, Fran and Chuck Marino, for their love and support, and without whom none of
this would be possible.
1 For instance, shareholders have asked IBM and Xerox to implement policies protecting
Catholic workers in the companies' Northern Ireland facilities; shareholders have opposed
Chevron's business in Marxist-controlled Angola; and white supremacist shareholders have
even attempted to effect changes in AT&T policies. See Jolie Solomon, Social Activists
Fighting Gag Rule; SEC Seeks Limits on Proxy Issues, BERGEN REC., May 17, 1992, at B-01
(discussing these and other issues that "social investors" have targeted).
2 The resolution process is embodied in Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, which
generally provides that shareholders holding a minimum amount of stock in a corporation
(determined either by dollar value or number of shares) may put forth and circulate certain
types of proposals at the corporation's expense. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (West,
WESTLAW through Apr. 19, 1999); Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Re-
visited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37,39 (1990) (discussing some of the rule's mechanics).
3 See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation
in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 379, 386 (1994)
(noting that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to adopt regulations governing proxies and proxy solicitation").
4 See Alan R_ Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 882 (1994) ("Since its promulgation five decades ago,
[Rule 14a-8] has undergone no less than fourteen revisions.").
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shareholder proposal from its proxy materialsL-the "ordinary business" ex-
clusion--and its impact on executive compensation regulation.
There has been a tremendous amount of scholarly writing concerning
executive compensation 7 and the ordinary business exclusion! There have
also been a substantial number of analyses regarding how these two issues
overlap.9 The most dramatic changes in the federal proxy rules occurred in
1992,10 however, leaving most of the in-depth analyses without adequate
time to witness the much-heralded fruits of these changes. Now is a good
time to reflect on these changes and examine shareholder activism relating
to executive compensation since these changes. The purpose of this analy-
sis is to evaluate whether a rise in shareholder proposals, one that is consis-
tently predicted by those favoring increased shareholder access to the
proxy," has actually occurred. This Comment will argue that the changes
adopted in 1992 did not significantly affect shareholder proposals relating to
executive compensation.
5 Generally, the materials include a corporation's annual report, proxy statement, and
proxy card. See ChaseMellon Unveils Its VoteDirect (SM) and VoteDirect Plus (SM) Intranet
and Internet Proxy Voting Products, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, PR News File (listing proxy materials).
6 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (allowing the omission of a proposal "[i]f the proposal
deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the regis-
trant"). This section was previously codified as 14a-8(c)(7), until the SEC amended the rule
in 1998. The section will be referred to as 14a-8(i)(7) throughout this Comment.
7 See, e.g., Graef S. Crystal, The Great CEO Pay Sweepstakes, FoRTUNE, June 18, 1990,
at 94, 94-96 (discussing executive compensation issues in corporate America); Bevis Long-
streth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders Growing Role in Executive Compensation, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
27, 1992, at 5 (same).
8 See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45
ALA. L. REV. 783, 796 n.51 (1994) (noting that the ordinary business exclusion is an obstacle
to shareholder activism); Palmiter, supra note 4, at 892 (defining and beginning a critique of
the ordinary business exclusion).
9 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-62 (1993) (discussing the relationship between the ordinary busi-
ness rule and executive compensation); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corpo-
rate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1867, 1894 n.77 (1992) (reviewing
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESS (1991)) (same).
10 The two main changes with which this Comment is concerned are the SEC's passage
of detailed disclosure rules, see Executive Compensation Disclosure Rule Amendments, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 6962, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at
83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992), and the reversal in SEC policy concerning the excludability of share-
holder proposals regarding executive compensation, see infra Part I.B. For a detailed discus-
sion of these two changes, see generally Tracy Scott Johnson, Note, Pay for Performance:
Corporate Executive Compensation in the 1990s, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 183 (1995).
11 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 9, at 1196 (noting that "limitations on shareholder access to
the proxy process prevent shareholders from initiating value-increasing changes" in their cor-
porations).
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The SEC recently ended another reexamination of the proxy rules. It is
useful to look at these new amendments with a view toward predicting
whether they will alter the analysis of executive compensation proposals
under the ordinary business exclusion. It is also instructive to consider the
role that the SEC has given itself, by proposing, but then not passing, a
number of amendments. This Comment will argue that the enacted amend-
ments will have virtually no effect on the analysis of executive compensa-
tion under today's Rule 14a-8(i)(7). Furthermore, the emphasis that com-
pensation critics place on altering the proxy rules as a means of correcting
compensation abuses is misplaced.
Underlying this entire analysis is the assumption that excessive levels of
executive compensation are a problem, and that they do, in fact, hurt some-
one.12  In some respects, this discussion is simply a restatement of the
shareholder passivity arguments originating from the work of Berle and
Means 13 and developed more fully earlier in this decade.14 This Comment
goes further, however, and argues that shareholders are not passive in gen-
eral; rather, there must be something in the fundamental nature of executive
compensation proposals that affects their treatment in ways that other pro-
posals are not so affected.
Part I explores executive pay issues and trends throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. Part II. discusses the history of shareholder proposals dealing
with executive compensation issues under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) since its adop-
tion in 1954. This Part focuses mainly on the changes in the proxy rules and
their interpretation since 1992 and the recently passed amendments to Rule
14a-8. Part III examines statistics compiled by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center ("IRRC") concerning the type and number of compensa-
tion-related proposals submitted by shareholders. This Part also outlines
12 This assumption is itself the focus of some scholarly debate. Compare, e.g., CRYSTAL,
supra note 9 passim (arguing from a variety of perspectives that executive compensation is
excessive), and Yablon, supra note 9, at 1874 (concluding that "there is strong evidence that
the current compensation of American CEOs is high by both recent historical and interna-
tional standards"), with Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993) (detailing some of the arguments that
support the view that executive compensation is not excessive), and Dana Wechsler, Just De-
serts, FORBES, May 28, 1990, at 208, 208 (asserting that "a lot of well-paid chief executives
have earned every dime").
13 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDnRm C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 69 (photo. reprint William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982) (MacMillan 1932)
(determining that as corporations grow and shareholders become more scattered, division
between ownership and control of the corporation is inevitable).
14 The essence of the story is that shareholders are simply passive, and efforts to remove
legal barriers through proxy reforms are useless. This tale was woven with great detail by
Professor Black. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv.
520, 522 (1990).
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some of the arguments that have been raised against increasing shareholder
access to the proxy and discusses the role of institutional investors. Finally,
Part IV examines Delaware judicial attempts at dealing with executive com-
pensation transactions. This Part gives a brief history of the tests used by
Delaware courts and discusses the standard recently articulated by the
Delaware Chancery Court in Lewis v. Vogelstein.1 This Part concludes by
setting out a proposal for addressing the problem of executive compensation
in state courts.
I. THE RISING TIDE: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TAKES OFF
A. The '80s: A Decade of Greed
Stock option grants gained trendiness during the 1980s,16 which is often
referred to as the "takeover era.' 17 During this decade, "average CEO[]
compensation increased by more than 200 percent... while the pay of the
average worker rose only about 50 percent."' 8 CEOs of major U.S. corpo-
rations were averaging thirty-five times the compensation of an average
U.S. manufacturing employee by the end of the decade.19 Not only were
problems evident when comparing executive pay to the pay of other U.S.
workers, but pay disparities between U.S. executives and their foreign
counterparts were also becoming clear.20 One commentator noted that the
"prevailing ethos at least condoned, if not extolled, the lifestyles of con-
spicuous consumption made possible by such compensation levels."
2'
15 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
16 See Andrew E. Serwer, Payday! Payday! What CEOs Make, FORTUNE, June 14,
1993, at 102, 102 ("[S]tock option grants [are] the main CEO pay trend of the eighties .... ").
A stock option is the right to purchase shares of stock of a corporation in the future at a price
that is anticipated to be below the actual value of the stock at the point when the option is ex-
ercised. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 842 (5th
ed. 1994).
17 James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors-Inside Is Out, 49 Bus. LAW. 1707, 1707
(1994).
18 James E. Heard, Shareholders Focus Concerns on Executive Compensation at 1992
Annual Meetings, 6 INSIGHTS 20, 20 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 6 No. 6 Insights 20.
19 See Joani Nelson-Horchler, The Pay Revolt Brews, INDUSTRY WK., June 18, 1990, at
28, 30 (noting a much lower CEO/employee pay differential in Japan, 15-to-i, and Europe,
20-to-I).
20 See MARK GREEN & BONNIE TENNERIELLO, FROM PAY TO PERKS TO PARACHUTES:
THE TROUBLE WITH EXEcUTIVE COMPENsATION 55 (Democracy Projects Reports No. 8,
1984) (comparing U.S. executive compensation with that of foreign counterparts).
21 Yablon, supra note 9, at 1881.
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The decade also saw the emergence of "compensation consultants"2
'
and "compensation committees,"2' both well-intentioned efforts at sanitiz-
ing the executive pay-setting process. In most large corporations, the final
determination concerning compensation comes from a confluence of these
two bodies-the compensation consultants "guide" the independent com-
mittee in making its decision.24
B. The Early '90s: What Recession?
In the early 1990s, the media and the recession combined to focus pub-
lic attention on executive salaries.25 The continued rise in executive com-
pensation would not have been so problematic if company profits also had
increased, or workers' earnings had risen commensurately, but studies indi-
cated that this was not so.26 Compensation simply did not correlate with
company performance: "CEOs enjoyed an average pay increase of 9.4% in
1991 even though their companies' profits declined 7% and the median
price of their companies' stock fell 7.7%."2 Thus, stock options, a means
22 Id. at 1877-81 (noting that although the ideal role of the compensation consultant is to
advise the corporation about executive compensation, the actual role is to justify pay raises for
the CEO). Graef Crystal, who was a compensation consultant for 20 years before switching
sides and focusing his concerns on the excessiveness of executive compensation, claims to
have overheard the following conversation between two directors:
Director 1: So what are you doing these days?
Director 2: I'm still a consultant to my company. I'm a sexual consultant.
Director 1: What do you mean?
Director 2: Well, when they signed me up for this deal they said, "If we want any of
your #O/o$&@ advice, we'll call you."
Dana Wechsler Linden & Vicki Contavespi, Incentivize Me, Please, FORBES, May 27, 1991,
at 208, 210.
2 Linden & Contavespi, supra note 22, at 208 ("Most big corporations have compensa-
tion committees composed of board members, often outside board members and always ex-
cluding the boss himself."); see also Bevis Longstreth, CEO Pay: Don't Let the Government
Decide, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at A17 (recognizing that excesses in compensation per-
sist despite the fact that compensation committees have been in place for some time in many
large corporations).
24 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1877-89 (discussing the emergence of compensation con-
sultants, and their influence on the board's compensation committee decision).
25 See Longstreth, supra note 23 (recognizing the influence of these two events). "[l]n an
atmosphere suffused with recession fears and election-year nonsense, the natural attractions of
the subject are magnified." Id.
26 See Robert J. McCartney, Executive Pay Rises, as Profits Fall, WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
1992, at C1 ("The average compensation of chief executives of America's largest companies
rose faster than the average earnings of workers last year, while profits of the companies they
headed fell sharply....").
27 Bogus, supra note 12, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
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of tying pay to performance, continued as a popular source of CEO in-
come in the early part of the decade.
29
Despite the heightened attention given to the issue, 141 companies paid
each of their CEOs a salary of over $1 million in 1991.30 One survey indi-
cated that the median annual compensation package given to CEOs of 200
of the largest U.S. companies during 1991 was $2.4 million.31 A similar
picture was presented during the next few years. According to a Forbes
study, the average pay of CEOs at the fifty largest U.S. corporations was
$3.5 million in 1992,32 while The Wall Street Journal reported the median
income of all CEOs to be an estimated $1.5 million for that year.33 Finally,
a 1993 survey conducted by Fortune indicated that the CEOs of 200 U.S.
corporations averaged salaries of $4.1 million.34 Although the country was
in a recession, it is clear that this factor was not noticed in compensation
committee discussions or in the boardroom.
A number of things should be made clear in looking at these figures
($2.4 million in 1991; $3.5 million in 1992; $4.1 million in 1993). First,
these figures are highly dependent on the calculation techniques used by
each surveyor. Some surveys include a weighted value for stock options,
even if these options are not exercised, while others fail to consider them if
28 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing the pay-for-performance ap-
proach, which links executive conipensation to company profits).
29 See Eric S. Hardy, Marathon Men, FORBES, May 23, 1994, at 140, 140 (noting that
"80% of the compensation of our top 25 corporate chiefs came from exercising stock options"
in 1993); McCartney, supra note 26, at C1 (referencing studies that indicated that CEOs got
the bulk of their compensation from stock options).
30 See Shawn Tully, What CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 94, 98 (de-
tailing the salary and total compensation for CEOs from companies like Coca-Cola, Phillip
Morris, and Allied-Signal).
31 See id. at 94-99 (demonstrating how base salary, bonuses, and stock options resulted in
astonishing figures). One commentator points out a particularly glum picture of 1991: "The
highest paid executive in corporate America in 1991 earned at least $58.9 million. In 1991,
when a sizable number of Americans were unable to find any work at all, an even dozen
CEOs brought home more than $10 million in annual compensation." Goforth, supra note 3,
at 417 (footnotes omitted).
32 See Susan Wong, Paychecks of the Super 50, FORBES, May 10, 1993, at 105, 105 (in-
dicating the average 1992 pay of executives at large corporations, including PepsiCo, General
Electric, and Walt Disney).
33 See William M. Mercer, Inc., The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1993, at R13
(citing 1992 compensation figures for the CEOs of top companies). Mercer notes that this
figure is dependent on the particular group surveyed. See id.
34 Brian Dumaine, A Knockout Year for CEO Pay, FORTUNE, July 25, 1994, at 94, 94
(noting that the 1993 salaries "[were not] just good, [they were] great").
199XECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE PROXY
they remain unexercised for the year.35 Second, some of these figures are
focusing on a particular class of CEOs (for example, "the Super 50"36),
while others purport to be reporting the mean or median for all CEOs.
Third, and most important for purposes of this discussion, these figures are
astonishingly large in absolute terms, regardless of the survey technique
used or the class sampled.37
Compensation committees also started to come under attack in the early
part of the decade? 8 Salient questions have been raised about the actual in-
dependence of these committees, which attempt to remove the self-interest
inherent in the pay-setting process and are usually the final arbiter of an ex-
ecutive's pay.39 So-called "negotiations" between a CEO and the outside
directors who determine her pay are hardly negotiations at all. Compensa-
tion committees advised by pay consultants usually set the CEO's salary.40
Companies, in turn, "usually tell the adviser that they want to set pay levels
at a certain industry percentile-often 75% or more."' 1 Forging mutually
beneficial relationships with the directors that make up the compensation
committee apparently does not hurt either--Congress has received testi-
mony to the effect that there is a strong relationship between a CEO's com-
pensation and the compensation of the board members on the compensation
35 See Crystal, supra note 7, at 94 (explaining that Fortune magazine's annual survey
includes a weighted value for stock options because some "CEOs don't realize option gains
until after retirement so the gains are never reported").
36 This is Forbes's designation. See Wong, supra note 32, at 105 (referring to the top 50
"Forbes 500 companies with the best composite ranking ordered by sales, profits, assets and
market value").
37 See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty as a Tonic
for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CoRP. L. 785, 791 (1992) (indicating
that "the absolute amounts earned by top executives... are and consistently have been enor-
mous"); Charles S. Clark, Should There Be a Limit on Executive Pay?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 10, 1997, at A29, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
("[Many observers of executive pay simply think that some dollar amounts are just plain ex-
cessive."); Longstreth, supra note 23, at A17 (noting "the high level of CEO compensation in
absolute terms"). But see Yablon, supra note 9, at 1875 (noting that "the absolute dollar
amounts of CEO compensation, while quite large as payments to individuals, are merely a
drop in the bucket to most corporate treasuries").
38 See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 9, at 37 (stating that "compensation committees of
boards of directors tend neither to be shrewd negotiators nor to conduct arm's-length negotia-
tions").
39 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1873 n.12 (discussing the "negotiation" process and the
fact that "there is a positive statistical correlation between the pay of CEOs and that of the
outside directors on their boards").
40 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, CEO Pay: Something Should Be Done-But Not by Con-
gress, Bus. WK., Feb. 3, 1992, at 29, 29 ("Usually, an executive's pay is determined by a
board committee that is guided by pay consultants hired by the company.").
41 Id.
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committee that determines the CEO's pay. Given these factors, it is gen-
erally acknowledged that a CEO can name her price.
43
Why the connection between director pay and CEO pay? This is an
area laden with conflicts of interest-these conflicts likely result in directors
acting in their own, rather than the shareholders', best interests. A clear
manifestation of this conflict is evident when analyzing the directors them-
selves. Most directors are top executives at other corporations, logically
suggesting that they would have a reciprocal interest in promoting healthy
executive pay levels.44 Two executives sitting on each other's compensa-
tion committees presents an even more egregious example of a conflict of
interest.
45
C. Compensation Trends Today
Executive compensation actually continued to increase after the SEC
passed the enhanced disclosure rules in 1992.46 Yet the disclosure rules
were aimed at facilitating shareholder awareness of compensation abuses.
47
And with increased awareness and the newly granted ability to put forward
a shareholder proposal addressing executive compensation, 48 shareholders
42 See The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay: Hearings on S. 1198 Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 102d Cong. 57-58 (1991) (statement of Graef Crystal, Adjunct Professor of Organiza-
tional Behavior and Relations, Walter A. Haas School of Business Administration, University
of California at Berkeley). In his book Crystal notes that "many of the compensation com-
mittee members may be personal friends of the CEO." CRYSTAL, supra note 9, at 50.
43 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1869 (noting that Graef Crystal's book "makes a powerful
case that a CEO, assisted by a good compensation consultant, can get his board of directors to
adopt virtually any compensation package").
44 See Bogus, supra note 12, at 37 (noting a director's personal interest in "promoting
high executive compensation").
45 See id. at 36 & n.192 (indicating that this situation may exist in as many as five percent
ofall firms).
46 See Joann S. Lublin, Higher Profits Fatten CEO Bonuses: But New Pay Packages
Come with More Strings Attached, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1993, at RI (citing the sharp rise in
CEOs' salaries and bonuses in 1992 as compared to 1991).
47 See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,327, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at 83,416
(Oct. 16, 1992) (indicating that increased shareholder awareness was going to be accom-
plished by "improv[ing] shareholders' understanding of all forms of compensation paid to
senior executives and directors"); Halle Fine Terrion, Comment, Regulation S-K, Item 402:
The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1175, 1195
(1993) (referring to the SEC belief that "the disclosure rules will sufficiently inform share-
holders about executive compensation abuses and [give them] the power to curb those
abuses").
48 See infra Part II.B (discussing the SEC decision to allow executive compensation-
related proposals to be included in proxy materials).
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were thought to hold the key to curbing managerial excess.49 The truth of
the matter, however, is that "the compensation of most CEOs rises each
year, as predictably as the sun comes up every day, even if their perform-
ance hurts a company's returns and imperils its future."50 In short, there are
no signs of a slow-down in pay increases.
A perennial problem for shareholders and commentators has been the
perceived lack of incentives for CEOs to perform well.51 This has led to
compensation reform suggestions which aim to tie pay to performance. The
"pay-for-performance mentality" 52 has often been linked to the rise in insti-
tutional shareholder activism since this is viewed as a relatively benign re-
quest to management and therefore one that institutional investors might be
willing to make. The idea behind these plans is to expose executives to
some of the risks that the shareholders of a corporation bear.5 3 Large sala-
ries do not create an efficient incentive scheme for managers because they
are often paid the same amount irrespective of corporate performance.
5 4
Shareholders need a justification for the sheer amounts of money being
doled out to executives. Fairness requires an increase in pay for a job well
49 See Terrion, supra note 47, at 1197 (predicting that the new disclosure system and the
reinterpretation of the ordinary business rule "will give shareholders the power to have input
in the management of the corporations which they own").
50 Dobrzynski, supra note 40, at 29.
51 See, e.g., Goforth, supra note 3, at 417 ("[The connection between CEO compensation
and corporate performance is not particularly strong."); Crystal, supra note 7, at 94-95 (noting
that the link between compensation and performance seems to be weakening); Elizabeth
Holtzman, Should Shareholders Have a Say in Execs' Pay? Yes: Link CEO's Pay to Per-
formance, USA TODAY, Apr. 27, 1992, at llA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy
File ("[S]everal studies have found little relationship between executive pay and perform-
ance.").
52 Richard H. Koppes, Institutional Investors, Now in Control of More than Half the
Shares of US. Corporations, Demand More Accountability, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 1997, at B5
(advocating a "pay-for-performance mentality" to align the interests of management with
those of "the corporation's shareowners, employees, and customers"). But see Kathy A.
Bayne, Corporate Governance Service 1997 Background Report C: Shareholder Proposals
on Executive Compensation, Publication of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Feb.
5, 1997, at 12 [hereinafter 1997 Shareholder Report] (noting that "linking pay to performance
can actually hurt shareholders by encouraging short-term thinking and manipulative record-
keep ng").
p See Koppes, supra note 52, at B5 ("In the future, [management] likely will have to be-
come exposed to the risks and rewards of economic performance--just like the corporation's
shareowners... ').
54 See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 916-17 (1992) (describing the "ratcheting effect" which
produces higher and higher levels of executive pay); Yablon, supra note 9, at 1877 (noting
that the "ratcheting effect" generates continuously higher levels of compensation regardless of
performance).
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done; fairness also suggests a cutback in cases of poor performance. 55 In-
stead, a study done in 1991 by compensation expert Graef Crystal indicated
that a 20% decline in company profits still, on average, resulted in a 7.6%
increase in pay, while a 30% profit decline resulted in a 6.1% increase in
pay.
5 6
Evidence indicates that institutional investors may be amenable to
linking an executive's pay to her performance.5 7 Research in recent years
demonstrates that pay-for-performance proposals receive "on average the
most support of any type of resolution to restrict executive compensation.""
Institutional investors, however, face a number of barriers to activism that
may work to limit their ability to constrain management, even with respect
to relatively benign shareholder proposals such as those concerning pay-for-
performance.59
There are indications that changes are on the horizon as corporate
America enters the new millenium. The situation at Bear Steams, a leading
investment banking firm, is illustrative of some of the most recent changes.
Although the top five executives at Bear Steams were paid a combined $87
million in fiscal year 1997, that compensation was tied completely to the
performance of the company. 60 The top five executives all have base sala-
ries of $200,000-the remainder of their salaries were derived from the
firm's profits, which jumped 25% during the year.61  Bear Steams, like
many other companies, also stopped doling out stock options a number of
55 See Crystal, supra note 7, at 95 ("[P]aying more for better performance is simply fair
and just-as long as the company also lowers pay for poor performance."). The obvious
managerial response to such an assertion is that the poor performance of a corporation is often
not a reflection of the executive's work, but rather a convergence of various market responses,
and the CEO should not be penalized for those forces over which she has no control. See gen-
erally ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD FOR
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (1986) (noting the limits of linking pay solely to market returns).
56 See Graef S. Crystal, How Much CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE, June 17, 1991, at 72,
76.
57 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 8 (noting the "growing percentage of
[institutional investor survey] respondents that have voting policies in favor of proposals to tie
pay to performance").
58 Id.
59 See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text (discussing a variety of factors that may
account for the lack of institutional investor activism in this area, such as agency costs associ-
ated with activism, preferences for liquidity, collective action problems, a lack of positive in-
centives, and conflicts of interest).
60 See Patrick McGeehan, Top Five Executives at Bear Stearns Tip Pay Scale with Total
of $87 Million, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at Cl ("The compensation of the investment-
banking firm's top officers is tied directly to the firm's profitability.").
61 See id. (noting the jump in profits and the linkage between the executives' pay and the
firm's profits).
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years ago.62 The formula used at Bear Steams-a low base salary with ad-
ditional compensation tied to performance-provides evidence that incen-
tive-based compensation can work and has likely earned Bear Steams kudos
from its shareholders.
A number of additional trends have emerged in the last few years.
First, along with the rise in incentive-based compensation, there also has
been a virtual disappearance of option repricing.63 Repricing has been dra-
matically affected by both "investor furor and the [SEC's] new proxy-
statement rules for executive pay."6 Options were originally introduced
into pay packages as a form of incentive-based compensation. If company
stock did well, executives holding options would exercise them and reap the
benefits. Conversely, if the company did poorly and stock value dropped
below the exercise price of the option, the option would be worthless. With
the introduction of repricing, companies were effectively able to take the
"incentive" out, because the options no longer had a downside.6 1 The IRRC
reported that fewer than five percent of the 1500 companies it studied re-
priced options in 1996.66
Another relatively new development is the increase in shareholder pro-
posals that try to link executive compensation with social performance.67
Companies in the 1990s have touted their ability to be socially responsible,
and shareholders have used resolutions as vehicles for encouraging compa-
nies to tie executive pay to the company's social performance. 8 According
to the IRRC, proposals linking social issues to executive pay were the most
62 See id. (indicating that this practice stopped in 1989). Note, however, that the overall
"trend toward paying executives in stock options has accelerated since a 1993 law capped the
amount of salary compensation a corporation can deduct from its taxes." Clark, supra note
37, at A29.
63 Option repricing occurs when the stock's price falls below the option's exercise price,
and the board of directors lowers the option's exercise price to account for the decrease in
share value. See Lublin, supra note 46, at RI. This gives companies the ability to turn "un-
derwater options" (that is, options that would not be exercised and hence have no value to the
holder) back into "in-the-money" options. See Kathy Bayne Ruxton, Corporate Governance
Service 1998 Background Report B: Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation,
Publication of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Mar. 25, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter
1998 Shareholder Report] (explaining the process by which "worthless options are trans-
formed into 'in-the-money' options once again"). See Zvi BODIE ET AL., INvESTMENTS chs.
19-20 (1996) for a general discussion of options.
64 Lublin, supra note 46, at RI.
65 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 4 (describing how repricing "unties"
the connection between compensation and performance).
66 See id. (indicating that only 76 companies out of 1500 repriced options in 1996).
67 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 13 (indicating that groups have begun
trying to "link pay to social and environmental performance").
See id. at 7 (providing a chart indicating that 18 proposals asked for disclosure about
how executive compensation in a corporation is tied to social issues).
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voted on type of proposal in 1997 although they received the lowest average
support of any type of proposal. 69 Finally, at the more extreme end of the
reforms, some companies even have indicated a willingness to freeze an ex-
ecutive's salary until she is able to demonstrate that she can generally per-
form at an acceptable level.7 °
In 1997, the vigorous renewal of shareholder interest in compensation
issues shook the corporate community.71 A "just vote no" proposal on the
golden parachute7 2 offered to former Disney President Michael Ovitz, who
quit after only fourteen months with the company, received thirteen percent
of the shareholder's votes.73 The parachute, which was estimated at
"somewhere from $15 million to $90 million-plus, depending upon how it's
calculated,, 74 struck a tender chord with shareholders and the public be-
cause of the poor job that Ovitz had done during his short tenure as the sec-
ond-in-charge at Disney.75 On the other hand, Michael Eisner, Disney's
well-compensated CEO and chairman, has managed to escape criticism be-
69 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 5 (noting that the votes averaged seven
percent for these proposals).
70 See Lublin, supra note 46, at RI (noting that "[a] number of [CEOs) received no raise
in 1992--usually because profits slumped or boards replaced cash with stock as part of a re-
structured pay package"). L. Dennis Kozlowski, then-CEO of Tyco Laboratories, Inc., in dis-
cussing the freeze on his salary, noted that "[t]he board said that there is nothing more in this
for you until we see your performance as a CEO.... It is a different era." Id.
71 See Philip Scipio, Proxy '98 May Be Quiet on Employment: Even with an SEC Rever-
sal on Cracker Barrel, the Focus May Be Elsewhere, INVESTOR REL. Bus., Sept. 22, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8784235 (noting that "it was executive compensation issues that caught
fire this past year... which had been percolating on the backburner since the new disclosure
rules [were] introduced in 1992-93").
72 "Golden parachutes provide executives with payments in the event they are fired or
find their jobs eliminated after a change in corporate control." Kristen Baird, Centerior Execs
May Reap Millions in Severance Pay Under Edison Deal, CRAIN'S CLEV. Bus., Feb. 17,
1997, at 1.
73 See Scipio, supra note 71 (citing the results of a shareholder vote on Ovitz's parachute
and quoting the director of corporate services at Institutional Shareholder Services as saying
that these "U]ust vote no campaigns came of age in 1997").
74 Mary Kane, Gold Standard: As Ovitz Case Shows, Exec Severance Pay Growing-No
Matter the Performance, STAR-TRM. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 14, 1997, at ID, available
in 1997 WL 7550456. In later litigation concerning this golden parachute, the Delaware
Chancery Court estimated its value at $140 million. See infra notes 250-51 (discussing the
shareholder derivative suit filed against Disney and the court's estimated value of the golden
parachute).
75 See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Hollywood Babylon One Disney Stockholder vs. A
Money Machine Gone Mad, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 4, 1997, at A19, available in 1997
WL 4510610 (noting what a disappointment Ovitz was for Disney).
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE PROXY
cause his compensation package is intricately tied to the company's stock
performance.
76
Binding shareholder resolutions were introduced for the first time in
199777 and were tested at a few companies during the year.78 Fleming
Companies Inc. is noteworthy in this area because its shareholders barred
management from reviving a poison pill without shareholder approval.79
Poison pills are used to deter unwanted takeovers by giving shareholders the
right to buy more shares at a discounted price, thus making a takeover much
less attractive for the acquirer.80 Fleming's shareholders only attempted the
binding resolution after a nonbinding resolution to remove the pill in 1996,
which garnered the support of sixty-four percent of the voting shares, was
ignored by management.81 Fleming decided to take down the pill voluntar-ily after a federal court upheld the validity of the binding resolution.82 The
76 See James Bates, Disney's Eisner Gets Contract Extension Fit for a Lion King, L.A.
TMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at DI (indicating that Eisner's wealth has come from the rise in Dis-
ney's stock price). Eisner, though, has not escaped the fracas completely unscathed. He
seethed at the shareholders' meeting when "one shareholder asked why he couldn't deduct
Ovitz's $96 million buyout from his potential $700 million, since he admitted that hiring
Ovitz was a mistake." Dowd, supra note 75, at A19.
77 Generally, shareholders propose nonbinding resolutions to avoid having their proposal
considered nonprecatory and thereby excludable under the proxy rules. Precatory is defined
as "[h]aving the nature of a prayer, request, or entreaty; conveying or embodying a recom-
mendation or advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive command or direction."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990). A binding shareholder resolution would
require action by the board of directors if the resolution is passed, as opposed to being advi-
sory in nature. See Judge Orders Fleming Vote: Shareholders Will Have Chance to Rescind
'Poison Pill', TULSA WORLD, Jan. 16, 1997, at E2, available in 1997 WL 3622202 (explain-
ing that instead of being merely advisory, these resolutions are the first to "[allow] sharehold-
ers [to] tell their boards what they can and can't do").
See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Harrah's and Union at Odds over Poison-Pill Vote
Tally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1997, at 38 (tracking the progress of a binding resolution at Har-
rah's Entertainment and also discussing Fleming's binding resolution); Joann S. Lublin, 'Poi-
son Pills'Are Giving Shareholders a Big Headache, Union Proposals Assert, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 1997, at C1 (indicating that binding resolutions appeared at both Fleming Companies
and May Department Stores Co.).
79 See Lublin, supra note 78, at Cl (noting that this vote "marked the first time that in-
vestors have imposed a mandatory limitation").
80 See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 793-94 (4th ed. 1996) (defining
"poison pill").
81 See Fleming Defense Opposed Shareholders Urged to Bar Poison Pill, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 15, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL 6299183 (noting that, in keep-
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binding shareholder resolution was hailed as "one of the most significant
trends developing [in the 1997] proxy season."
83
In another important decision concerning Fleming, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court recently upheld the right of that company's shareholders to put
forth and pursue a mandatory bylaw.84 This is "the first time that a state su-
preme court has upheld stockholders' rights to bring a binding bylaw pro-
posal,"85 and casts doubt on whether the SEC will continue to require that
shareholder proposals be precatory in order to pass muster.
8 6
II. HISTORY OF THE "ORDINARY BUSINESS" EXCLUSION AS IT
APPLIES TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. Early History
Congress's original intent in adopting the federal proxy rules was to
"institutionalize the ideal of corporate democracy"87 and to provide an as-
surance of "fair, and effective shareholder suffrage.,,88 Rule 14a-8 is gener-
ally known as the shareholder proposal rule, and it enables certain share-
holders to put forth proper proposals in a corporation's proxy materials at
the expense of the corporation. The exceptions to the rule, which are now
listed in Rule 14a-8(i), limit a shareholder's ability to make certain types of
proposals.
8 9
83 Philip Scipio, Binding Resolutions Are on the Way, MERGERS & RESTRUCTURING,
May 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9077763.
4 See Joann S. Lublin, Oklahoma Court Affirms Holders'Right to Pursue a Binding By-
law Proposal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1999, at B2 (describing the decision by Oklahoma's
highest court).
85 Id.
86 See supra note 77 (defining the term "precatory"); infra note 100 (noting the SEC's
position that shareholder proposals need to be phrased in precatory terms).
87 Goforth, supra note 3, at 385-86.
88 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,353, at 83,355 (Oct. 16, 1992).
89 The exceptions are as follows:
The registrant may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its
proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders.
(2) If the proposal, if implemented, would require the registrant to violate any
state law or Federal law of the United States, or any law of any foreign juris-
diction to which the registrant is subject... ;
(3) If the proposal or the supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commis-
sion's proxy rules and regulations... ;
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against
the registrant or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to
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The ordinary business exclusion was added to section 14 in 1954.90 It
operates to exclude proposals from the proxy materials that are deemed to
deal with the ordinary business of the corporation. 91 The authority to ex-
clude these types of proposals comes from the directors' powers over the
general affairs of the corporation.92 Since the addition of Rule 14a-8(i)(7)
to the proxy rules, the SEC's policy had been to send no-action letters93 to
the proponent or to further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is not
shared with the other security holders at large;
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of
the registrant's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for
less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal
year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the registrant's business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the registrant's power to effectu-
ate;
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary
business operations of the registrant;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office;
(9) If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the registrant at the
meeting;
(10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
(11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously submitted
to the registrant by another proponent, which proposal will be included in the
registrant's proxy material for the meeting;
(12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as a prior
proposal submitted to security holders in the registrant's proxy state-
ment...within the preceding five calendar years, it may be omit-
ted... Provided, That-
(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such preceding
period, it received less than three percent of the total number of votes
cast in regard thereto; or
(ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preced-
ing period, it received at the time of its second submission less than six
percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(iii) If the prior proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during
such preceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less
than 10 percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(i) (West, WESTLAW through Apr. 19, 1999).
90 See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979,
1954 SEC LEXIS 38, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1954) ("Under the provisions of the amended
[r]ule... management would.., be permitted to omit... a proposal which is a recommen-
dation or request with respect to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the is-
suer."). As mentioned previously, the exclusion was originally codified as Rule 14a-8(c)(5),
was later changed to (c)(7), and was most recently changed to (i)(7).
91 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
92 See Terrion, supra note 47, at 1193-94 (describing the plenary powers of directors over
the ordinary business of a corporation).
93 "A no-action letter is a non-binding assurance that the SEC will not take action against
a company if the facts of a situation are what the company claims .... [lit is generally re-
garded as a valuable gauge of the SEC staff's thinking" and is therefore useful to a corpora-
tion seeking to exclude a proposal. Peter Blacknan, Swaying Corporations; City Funds
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companies that desired to exclude any proposals dealing with compensation
from the proxy materials. 94 The dominant view at that time, and still among
some today, is that compensation issues should be left to the discretion of
management.
95
Over time, the Commission began to allow certain proposals that dealt
with specific types of executive compensation to be included in the proxy
materials. 96 Still, the general exclusion on executive compensation propos-
als persisted. Further, even if a shareholder could sidestep these subject-
matter limitations, she would still have to comply with the procedural re-
quirements of Rule 14a-8 in order for her proposal to be includable.
97
B. 1992 SEC Switch
As public opinion about the excessiveness of executive compensation
became more pronounced, SEC views shifted on the issue of whether share-
holder proposals in this area should be excludable from the proxy materi-
als.98 In early 1992, the SEC sent out ten no-action letters on the same day,
Adopt Behind-the-Scenes Approach, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1994, at 5. The SEC has acknowl-
edged that "companies often rely on past no-action positions when responding to a share-
holder proposal." Expedited Publication of Interpretive, No-Action and Certain Exemption
Letters, Exchange Act Release No. 6764, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,412, 12,413 (SEC 1988).
94 See, e.g., Pinnacle West Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 538 (Mar. 23, 1990) (acknowledging a basis for the company's view that the compen-
sation proposal may be excluded from the proxy materials); UAL Corp., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 342 (Feb. 23, 1990) (same); General Elec. Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 136 (Jan. 31, 1990) (same); Scott Paper Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1242 (Dec. 27, 1989) (same); American Tel. & Tel.
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1618 (Dec. 8, 1988) (same); Newport
Pharms. Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2507 (Aug. 10, 1984)
(same).
95)See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that the "prevalent view [is] that
compensation issues are chiefly, and perhaps exclusively, within the province and control of
directors"); see also In re Consumer Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 F.R.D. 455, 483 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (evidencing a court's reluctance to second-guess a corporation's decision).
96 See Alexander G. Simpson, Note, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School. Now
Is the Winter of Our Discontent, 43 DuKE L.J. 189, 211 (1993) ("[The SEC considered 'three
classes of remuneration [to] transcend ordinary business ... ."' (footnote omitted) (quoting
Shareholder Rights: Nanny Changes Her Mind, ECoNOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 84-85)); Jo-
seph E. Bachelder III, Recent SEC Initiatives, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 30, 1992, at 3 ("Over the past
three years, the SEC has allowed advisory proposals on certain aspects of executive pay, in-
cluding proposals relating to parachute payments, disclosure as to executive pay and share-
holders' advisory committees.").
97 For example, requirements dealing with the length of a proposal, format, and re-
submission thresholds must be satisfied. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (West,
WESTLAW through Apr. 19, 1999) (stating the 500 word limit on proposals).
98 See Simpson, supra note 96, at 211-12 (noting that the SEC's views shifted along with
the public's views). "The increased media and scholarly attention devoted to the subject, as
well as the staggering amounts of money involved, have elevated the issue of executive coin-
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all refusing to allow the exclusion of proposals relating to executive com-
pensation.99 Of course, the proposals still needed to address only "execu-
tive" compensation and also had to be phrased in precatory terms in order to
pass muster.100  Then-Chairman Breeden explained the SEC's change in
policy: "[T]he level of public and shareholder concern over the issue of
senior executive compensation has become intense and widespread.''
Other commentators focused on the potential for self-dealing that is inherent
in the existing pay-setting scenario as a justification for including these pro-
posals.
0 2
Recognizing that shareholders cannot attack compensation abuse if they
do not understand it, the SEC also amended the proxy rules in 1992 to pro-
vide for easier communication among shareholders and enhanced disclosure
of executive compensation. 103 These amendments were designed to "afford
pensation beyond the level of ordinary business operations." Id. For a particularly caustic
view of SEC policy, see Palmiter, supra note 4, at 882, indicating that "[Il]ately, the agency's
interpretive flip-flops in no-action letters have become legion."
99 See Aetna Life & Cas. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,104 (Feb. 13, 1992) (refusing to give permission to a company to
exclude a proposal from the company's proxy materials); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,101 (Feb. 13,
1992) (same); Battle Mountain Gold Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,107 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same); Bell Ad. Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,110 (Feb. 13, 1992)
(same); Black Hills Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 76,102 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same); Chrysler Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-
1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,103 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same); Eastman
Kodak Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,109 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same); Equimark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,108 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same); Grumman Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,105 (Feb. 13, 1992)
(same); IBM Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH 76,106 (Feb. 13, 1992) (same).
100 See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 7, at 6 ("[T]he SEC has taken the position that
proposals couched in precatory terms generally avoid I problem[s]."). The SEC has excluded
proposals specifically because they would have mandated that the board or the corporation
take a specific action. See, e.g., McDonald & Co. Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 692 (May 6, 1991) (deciding that a proposal mandating that the board
take certain action could be excluded); Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,473 (Feb. 22, 1990) (deciding that a proposal
would not be excludable if the proposal were changed so that the board's authority was not
subject to the control of the proposed committee).
101 Breeden Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 7 Corp. Couns.
WAdr. (BNA) 1, at 1 (Feb. 19, 1992).
02 See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that the ordinary business exclu-
sion should not apply because of the "potential for self-dealing by senior executives and di-
rectors").
103 See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at 83,431 (Oct. 16, 1992) ("[S]hare-
holders have a clear interest in knowing what contractual commitments the board has
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investors ample opportunity to communicate their views to other sharehold-
ers" 0 4 and to remove "unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of
views and opinions by shareholders."'0 5 The idea behind these revisions
was that they would give shareholders more information and enable them to
participate at greater levels, thereby providing motivation for corporations
to monitor executive compensation decisions on their own. 106 There were
only a few compensation-related proposals in 1992, however, perhaps due
to the fact that the SEC's policy reversal came after the proposal filing
deadlines for most companies.
0 7
C. The Current Status of Executive Compensation Under Rule 14a-8(i) (7)
and the Impact of the Latest Series of SEC Amendments
The ideology accompanying the 1992 switch remains today, despite the
urgings of various critics who have indicated that the reform process must
continue.1 8 Some scholars urge reforms with respect to specific policies:
(1) the SEC's policy still does not directly give shareholders the right to
vote on an executive's pay package since any proposal put forth and voted
on is still only advisory and proposals need to be couched in precatory terms
that merely request board action;10 9 and (2) the SEC policy continues to of-
fer only a narrow window for shareholders-their proposals can only relate
to "senior executive compensation" not "general compensation policy."
110
Regardless of whether these changes ever occur, the changes that already
have been made do not adequately address the lurking problem of executive
overcompensation.
made ... both with respect to present inducements to join the registrant's top management
and future promises....").
104 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,051, at 83,372 (Oct. 16, 1992).
105 Id. 83,353.
106 See Terrion, supra note 47, at 1178 (citing increased access to information and in-
creased participation as motivators for corporations to curb excessive compensation).
107 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 2.
108 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 9, at 1131 ("The 1992 revisions cannot be seen as the final
step in the reform process . .. ."); Institutional Investors to Ask SEC to Look at Shareholder
Proposal Rule, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1743, 1743-44 (Nov. 13, 1992) (requesting that
the SEC reexamine the procedural requirements of the rule again).
109 See Palmiter, supra note 4, at 890-91 ("Among the agency's most established as-
sumptions is that state law permits only precatory shareholder resolutions that request, but do
not demand, board action."); Simpson, supra note 96, at 212 ("Under the SEC's new policy,
any shareholder proposal is merely advisory in nature."); see also supra notes 77, 100 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirement that proposals be advisory).
Simpson, supra note 96, at 212. It is easy to see how a narrow definition of "senior"
makes it impossible to attack the salaries of many highly paid executives through shareholder
proposals.
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1. Impact of the Latest Series of Amendments
The reform process has continued in the form of new amendments to
the federal proxy rules, which followed an extensive study and survey of the
issues conducted by the SEC."'1  The response to the proposed SEC
amendments was mixed-some thought that they would be an improvement
in certain areas,112 while others believed that they would be severely detri-
mental to shareholder rights. t 13 Some of the proposed amendments were
passed by the SEC "with modifications" in 1998, and were effective by the
start of the 1999 proxy season.
11 4
What is most instructive about the latest series of amendments is not
what changes were made, but rather, what changes were not made. For in-
stance, the inclusion of executive compensation-related proposals arguably
would have been affected indirectly by the SEC amendments if they had
been passed in their entirety as proposed. While purportedly expanding the
III The responses from the 66-question survey were quite varied, and are on file in the
SEC office in Washington, D.C. On file in the Public Reference Room in January 1998 were
331 responses from shareholders, corporations, and shareholder activist groups. The survey,
which was sent out before the proposed rules were released, had two questions dealing di-
rectly with executive compensation. For an example of the survey, and questions relating to
executive compensation, see Securities and Exchange Commission Survey, File No. S7-25-
97, Apr. 1, 1997 (response of Cheryl Sorokin, Executive Vice President & Corporate Secre-
tary of BankAmerica Corp.) (on file in SEC Public Reference Room). Of those corporations
that answered Question 46d (which asked whether proposals relating to executive/director
compensation should always be included, regardless of a numerical limit on proposals), only
14 survey respondents provided an affirmative response (4.2%). Question 54a (which asked
whether executive/director compensation proposals should always be included if the existing
shareholder proposal rule is retained) received 46 affirmative replies (13.9%).
112 For instance, the Vice President and Secretary of W.R. Grace & Co. wrote that "the
proposed amendments appear to have been carefully thought through and generally represent
a reasonable balance of the divergent views of the Commission's various constituencies."
Public Comment, W.R. Grace & Co., File No. S7-25-97, SEC Public Reference Room.
113 See, e.g., Public Comment, Patricia T. Bimie, Chair, GE Shareholders Alliance, File
No. S7-25-97, SEC Public Reference Room ("I would submit that your proposed changes so
strongly favor corporate interests that it would make it much more difficult, if not impossible,
for the small stockholder to raise issues of ethical, environmental, or social responsibil-
ity...."); Public Comment, Karen M. Donahue, Justice Team, Sisters of Mercy of the
Americas, File No. S7-25-97, SEC Public Reference Room ("This package of reforms is a
step in the wrong direction... !); Public Comment, Sister Katherine Maria Glosenger,
Treasurer, Sisters of Mercy of the Americas, File No. S7-25-97, SEC Public Reference Room
("The Rule should be even handed and balanced providing for checks and balances for inves-
tors and companies.'); see also Groups Oppose SEC Stance on Shareholder Issues, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 1997, at A8 (noting the alliance formed by opponents to the proposed SEC rules).
114 See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg.
29,106, 29,106 (SEC 1998) [hereinafter Final Rule] (providing the complete text of the SEC
final amendments).
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acceptable range of shareholder proposals,' 5 the amendments would have
simultaneously made it more difficult for shareholders to submit and resub-
mit proposals."16  The inclusion of a three percent override mechanism
(where resolution proponents who could demonstrate support of three per-
cent of the shareholders for their proposal could override an exclusion),1
1 7
although helpful to larger investors, was not viewed by small shareholders
as outweighing the negative impacts of the increased resubmission thresh-
olds and holding requirements.
However, the only amendments mentioned in the preceding paragraph
that were actually passed were the ones increasing the dollar value of a
company's shares that a shareholder must own in order to submit a pro-
posaln1 and reversing SEC policy concerning the Cracker Barrel deci-
sion. 119 None of the more controversial reforms were passed by the SEC,
"due in part to strong concerns expressed by commenters."1 20 The only
major change made was to recast Rule 14a-8 into a plain-English question
and answer format, in order to aid shareholders and corporations in under-
115 This was to be accomplished through the reversal of the Cracker Barrel decision. See
SEC Reverses Course on Shareholder Powers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 22, 1997, at B20
(discussing the SEC's decision to allow Cracker Barrel to exclude a proposal barring the com-
pany from discriminating against gay applicants because it determined that the issue fell
within the ordinary business exclusion). This reversal in position was accepted by the SEC in
the Final Rules which were promulgated in 1998. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,108
("We are adopting our proposal to reverse the Cracker Barrel position ....").
116 This result would have been accomplished primarily in two ways. First, it was pro-
posed that Rule 14a-8(i)(12), which states the percentage thresholds for resubmission of a
proposal, be amended to reflect higher percentages (to 6% on the first submission, 15% on the
second submission, and 30% on the third-an increase from the pre-amendment levels of 3%,
6%, and 10%, respectively). See Amendments to Rule on Shareholder Proposals, Release No.
34-39093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,684-95 (SEC 1997) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (providing
the complete text of the SEC's proposed amendments); see also supra note 89 (quoting the
text of Rule 14a-8(i)(12)). Increasing the threshold levels of support that a proposal must at-
tain would have made it more difficult for shareholders to get a resubmitted proposal into the
proxy materials for a second or third time. Second, it was proposed that Rule 14a-8(a)(1),
which required a proposing shareholder to hold continuously the lesser of $1000 or 1% of the
company's shares, be amended by increasing the holding amount to $2000. See Proposed
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,674.
117 See Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,690 (discussing the proposed "override"
mechanism).
118 The holding amount was increased from $1000 to $2000. See Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 29,111 (noting that this change was made to "adjust for the effects of inflation since
the rule was last revised"); see also supra note 116 (discussing the proposed change to the
holding requirement). The release also noted that "[tjhere was little opposition to the pro-
posed increase among commenters." Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,111-12.
119 See supra note 115 (discussing the Cracker Barrel decision).
120 Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,106.
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standing the rule.121 Thus, these reforms arguably will have little or no sub-
stantive effect on shareholder proposals in general and no effect on share-
holder proposals concerning executive compensation.
122
The SEC was quite comical in its treatment of the proxy rule situation,
given that it was rejecting virtually all of the reforms that could potentially
have had any substantive impact on the shareholder proposal process:
Some of the proposals we are not adopting share a common theme: to reduce
the Commission's and its staff's role in the process and to provide shareholders
and companies with a greater opportunity to decide for themselves which pro-
posals are sufficiently important and relevant to the company's business to
justify inclusion in its proxy materials. However, a number of commenters re-
sisted the idea of significantly decreasing the role of the Commission and its
staff as informal arbiters .... [C]ommenters were equally unsupportive of
fundamental alternatives to the existing rule and process that, in different de-
grees, would have decreased the Commission's overall participation.
123
Thus, despite the SEC's valiant efforts to remove itself from its firmly
entrenched position as ringmaster between the competing interests of share-
holders and firms, the amended rules "will continue to require [the SEC] to
make difficult judgments about interpretations of proposals, the motives of
those submitting them, and the policies to which they relate."'12 4 With its
customary naivet6, the SEC announced that the one major change it did
make to the rule (question and answer format) may result in more share-
holder proposals being submitted each year.
125
2. Views on SEC Policy
Criticism of SEC policy flows from every direction. Managers and
other corporate critics say that the proxy rules are too weak, allowing people
with strong convictions to use the shareholder proposal process to promote
their own agendas. 26 Shareholders still largely feel that the SEC rules are
121 See id. at 29,114 (explaining that the revision of Rule 14a-8 should "decrease the time
and expense incurred by both shareholders and companies attempting to comply with the pro-
visions").
122 See infra text accompanying notes 155-57 for a discussion of one possible substantive
effect on executive compensation proposals that might have occurred had the amendments
been assed as proposed.
Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,106.
124 Id.
125 See id. at 29,119 ("Because the rule's added clarity may make it easier for sharehold-
ers to understand the procedures for submitting shareholder proposals, the amendments may
encourage shareholders to submit more shareholder proposals to companies each year.").
126 See Barbara Pinckney, SEC May Change Rule on Proxy Statements, CAP. DIsTRICT
Bus. REv. (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 11-17, 1997, at 11 (indicating the critics' view that people
with strong religious and social convictions abuse the proposal process).
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too restrictive, as were the proposed amendments to the rules.' 27 Journalists
and academics pounce on the SEC's apparent indecisiveness about proxy
issues. 28 One of the most scathing commentaries appeared in 1995:
The SEC is institutionally incapable of passing on the merits of shareholder
initiatives-the SEC's recent inconstancy paints a sad portrait of a bureaucracy
aimlessly in search of purpose. SEC staff, moved by what the popular press
considers newsworthy or by personal political views on recent corporate gov-
ernance trends, seems quite unable to delineate which initiatives shareholders
should be able to consider and which ones they should not.
129
Shareholder activists, eager to put forth what they believe to be valid pro-
posals, feel that the SEC too clearly favors management.
30
Overall, the SEC is viewed as being responsive to management interests
and public (highly visible) concerns.' 3' Furthermore, the SEC interpretation
of the ordinary business exclusion has come to be regarded merely as "sub-
jective linedrawing," often done without any rhyme or reason.
32
127 See, e.g., Peter C. Harkins & J.W. Comwell, SEC Mulls Shareholder Proposals in
Proxy Forms, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at B12 (noting that the responses to a recent SEC
survey indicate that, while companies want narrower guidelines for inclusion, institutions and
other shareholder groups "favor] broader access"); Public Comment, Bimie, supra note 113,
at 4 (suggesting that the amendments are making the stockholder proposal route "inaccessi-
ble" and "severely limiting [the] access of stockholders"); Public Comment, Donahue, supra
note 113, at 1 (noting that the amendments "further limit[ shareholder participation and
make[] it much more difficult for shareholders to bring serious social and ethical matters to
the attention of management and other shareholders").
128 See Mary L. Schapiro, Shareholders Should Have a Soapbox, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9,
1993, at A2 (criticizing the ordinary business exclusion and the SEC's "case-by-case decision
making that shifts with the political and corporate governance views of the staff and individ-
ual commissioners').
129 Palmiter, supra note 4, at 905 (citations omitted).
130 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1994) (noting that proxy reform has come slowly, and
only amidst accusations of strong managerial favoritism at the SEC and of attempts to chill
the dissident shareholders' voices); Rob Wells, Activists Pitch Wide Range of Social Issues to
Shareholders, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Apr. 14, 1996, at C2, available in 1996 WL
9902552 ("The activists feel the SEC is really tilted against them and in favor of the business
community...." (internal quotation omitted)).
131 See Public Comment, Birnie, supra note 113, at 1-4 (critiquing the SEC's proposals).
132 Harkins & Cornwell, supra note 127, at B12.
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III. WERE SHAREHOLDERS UP TO THE CHALLENGE?
A. An Examination of Shareholder Proposals Submitted
from 1994 to the Present
1. To Rise or Fall?
Many journalists and commentators predicted that there would be a sig-
nificant increase in shareholder proposals as a result of the changes in 1992
concerning enhanced disclosure and the interpretation of the proxy rules as
they relate to executive compensation.1 33 The number of shareholder pro-
posals dealing with corporate governance issues have increased each year
since 1992. Overall, the total number of shareholder proposals offered also
have increased generally since 1992. These figures are clear from the fol-
lowing table, created with information provided by the IRRC:1
3 4
Table 1.







However, when narrowing the class of corporate governance proposals
to those strictly dealing with executive compensation, a very different pic-
ture emerges. Against a backdrop of serious discussion among practitio-
ners, academics, journalists, and the SEC to increase shareholder access to
the proxy, statistics reveal that shareholder proposals concerning executive
compensation have actually dropped in recent years,135 and institutional in-
vestors have played a weak role overall.
133 See, e.g., Bachelder, supra note 96, at 3 ("A consequence of this SEC change proba-
bly will be a dramatic increase in the number of shareholder proposals for inclusion in proxy
statements.").
134 Facsimile from Drew Hambly, Research Analyst, Investor Responsibility Research
Center, to Lori Marino I (Feb. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at I (noting a decline in proposals in
1996, the third consecutive year that there was a drop in resolutions that came to a vote).
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The IRRC has a "universe" 136 of corporations that it tracks for share-
holder proposals. Following is another tabulation of information compiled
by the IRRC specifically related to executive compensation:
37
Table 2.
Year Total Proposals Total Proposals Average Support
Submitted Voted On for Proposals
1995 80 40 11.8%
1996 63 37 11.1%
1997 116 47 10.4%
1998 72 38 8.6%
This data presents an interesting picture of the state of executive com-
pensation-related proposals. First, the average support level for proposals in
this area remains pitifully low. Resolution proponents seem unable to mus-
ter significant shareholder support, regardless of what type of executive
compensation resolution is proposed. 3 8 Next, looking at the total number
of proposals submitted, an odd picture emerges. Taking the data back one
more year,139 research compiled by the IRRC demonstrated a decline in the
number of executive compensation proposals for the years 1994 to 1996.
The high 1997 figure appears to be the anomaly, largely due to the efforts of
a single shareholder who put forth twenty-one of the resolutions on his
own. 140 The return to a much lower number of proposals submitted (72) in
136 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 2 (describing the different groups that
make up the research universe). The data for 1997 were drawn from a universe called the
"Super 1500," while the data for 1996 were drawn from a somewhat different composition of
firms. See id.
137 This data was compiled from the IRRC reports done in each of the last three years.
See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52; 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 2;
Drew Hambly, Corporate Governance Service 1999 Background Report B: Shareholder
Proposals on Executive Compensation, Publication of the Investor Responsibility Research
Center [hereinafter 1999 Shareholder Report].
138 The IRRC breaks down the proposals put forth each year into groups, for example,
those tying pay to performance, capping executive pay, or tying executive proposals to social
responsibility. See generally 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 2-10. But regardless
of how the proposal is classified, support levels remain low. See id.
139 The 1994 number of total proposals submitted was 106. See 1997 Shareholder Re-
port, spra note 52, at 2.
140 Shareholder Paul Sheehan's proposal, which sought to index executive stock option
exercise prices to inflation, was either omitted, withdrawn, not revised in accordance with
SEC instructions, or not in the proxy of any company to which he submitted a proposal. See
1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 3 (describing Sheehan's proposal to "peg option
exercise prices to the consumer price index" and their failure to appear in any proxy state-
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1998 strengthens this hypothesis. Overall then, it seems fairly conservative
to state that over the last four years, the number of proposals submitted has
stayed relatively flat and at a very low level, while the average support for
these proposals has also remained low.
For a variety of reasons, the total number of proposals that are actually
brought to a vote at any company is always markedly different from the
number submitted.141 Again, the 1997 proxy season was the anomaly, with
a slightly higher number of proposals that actually came to a vote. Other-
wise the figure has remained pretty consistent over the past four years-
consistently low. What happened to the astonishing sixty-nine proposals
that were brought in 1997 but never came to a vote? Thirty-three of them
did not withstand SEC scrutiny and were omitted by the company from the
proxy statement, four were not revised in accordance with SEC require-
ments, fourteen were withdrawn, nine were not presented, eight did not ap-
pear in the proxy materials, and one was postponed. Based on these
numbers, it is clear that companies are not afraid to take their case for omis-
sion to the SEC.
How much, however, can we really read into the numbers? For the
sake of the argument put forth in this Comment, it does not take too much
reading. Once one accepts the figures presented at the start of this Section
in Table 1, indicating that in recent years shareholders in general have been
more active in bringing proposals, invoking the shareholder passivity argu-
ment with respect to executive compensation proposals loses some force.
143
Shareholders are not passive in general, but they are passive when it comes
to these types of proposals. This simply alerts us to the possibility that there
may be something in the nature of executive compensation proposals that
makes them an unattractive topic for activism. In the next Section, I will
make the case that it is only the individual shareholder that has been willing
to take up the cause of the compensation critics. In the next Subpart, I will
ments). Were it not for his 21 proposals, the 1997 figure would have been 95. Note that Paul
Sheehan did not bring any resolutions in the 1998 proxy season. See 1999 Shareholder Re-
port, supra note 137, at I (noting Sheehan's failure to revive his resolutions).
141 The differences between columns two and three of Table 2 are due to the fact that
some proposals are withdrawn, some are not revised in accordance with SEC requirements,
some are not presented at the annual shareholder meeting, and some are omitted by the com-
pany. See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 2; 1998 Shareholder Report, supra
note 63, at 3.
142 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 7-10 (presenting these figures). Note
that the analogous figures for 1996 were all much lower. See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra
note 52, at 2. In that year, the SEC issued no-action letters on 12 resolutions, an additional six
were not revised according to SEC recommendations, "one did not appear in the proxy mate-
rials, four were withdrawn, and one was not presented." Id.
143 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder passivity argu-
ment).
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address why institutional investors are unwilling, or unable, to make inroads
in this area. The underlying message here is one for the compensation crit-
ics: although increasing shareholder access to the proxy has promise in
certain areas of shareholder activism, it has proved futile in the area of ex-
ecutive compensation, and therefore seeking relief by way of the proxy rules
is misguided.
2. Which Shareholders Are Waging the Battle?
Interestingly, it has been individual shareholders who have largely
fought the battle on executive pay through shareholder proposals. 1 4 Indi-
viduals sponsored all but eight of the executive compensation proposals in
1996;145 individuals were responsible for nearly three-quarters of the reso-
lutions in 1997; 146 and individuals again put forth a majority of the propos-
als in 1998.147 Unless institutional investors are finding behind-the-scenes
methods of influencing this issue, the figures seem to indicate that the rise
of the institutional investor has not been the panacea that some suggested it
would be. 4  In fact, a 1996 IRRC survey of voting by institutional inves-
tors revealed that "[o]verall, the percentage of surveyed respondents with
blanket policies of voting against such resolutions outnumber[s] that of re-
spondents with blanket policies in favor of them." 149 Not only are institu-
tional investors not bringing these proposals, but growing numbers of insti-
tutional investors are, in effect, hindering shareholders who do bring such
proposals by instituting blanket policies of voting down these proposals.
50
The exception to this trend concems proposals that tie pay to performance.
144 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 3 (indicating that "individual share-
holders have led the charge on the pay issue" since 1992).
145 See id.
146 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 3 (describing the role of individual
shareholders in pay-related proposals).
147 See 1999 Shareholder Report, supra note 137, at 3. 1998 marks the first year that
institutional investors (mostly union funds) have played any significant role in sponsoring ex-
ecutive compensation-related proposals-they sponsored 47% of the proposals. The IRRC
notes that "[t]his is a dramatic shift in shareholder activism by institutional investors. In ad-
dition, approximately 50 percent of the resolutions tracked by IRRC for 1999 are sponsored
by institutional investors." Id. Thus last year could indicate a turning point in shareholder
activism.
148 See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing institutional investors).
149 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 8. But see Koppes, supra note 52, at B5
(indicating that "[i]nstitutional investors have resisted skyrocketing executive compensation
packages").
See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 8 (indicating that a growing propor-
tion of institutional investors oppose resolutions on executive pay).
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These proposals had increasing support from institutional investors from
1994 to 1996.15
Not only are individual investors submitting the most proposals, but
they are also quite persistent in their desire to effect changes in this area of
corporate governance. A number of the shareholder proponents in 1997
were repeat players-they offered the same resolutions at a number of dif-
ferent companies in which they owned stock.15 2 Furthermore, a number of
153the proponents in 1997 had submitted similar proposals in 1996. Both of
these trends (submissions at multiple companies and in multiple years) con-
tinued in the 1997 proxy season.
54
With these factors in mind, it is clear that the proposed increase in the
resubmission thresholds would have had a dramatic effect on the number of
proposals that could be brought in the area of executive compensation.
155
The average percentage of shareholder support across all types of proposals
on executive compensation has hovered around ten percent over the last
four proxy seasons. 56 Because the proposed amendment would have in-
creased the resubmission thresholds, many of the repeat proposals would
have been excludable at the second resubmission level (fifteen percent).
Without institutional investor support, an individual shareholder would have
had an extremely difficult time satisfying the heightened resubmission
thresholds. Of course, the SEC chose not to further restrict access to the
proxy in this way and rejected the proposed amendments, leaving this area
substantively unchanged.
5 7
151 See id. ("According to the survey, support for this type of proposal increased 21 per-
cent .... "); see also Lublin, supra note 46, at RI (indicating that institutions have no problem
supporting executive compensation packages as long as they are tied to performance).
152 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 7-8 (noting that E. George submitted
proposals at nine companies; E. Davis submitted proposals at eight companies; A. Gavitt
submitted proposals at five companies; and P. Sheehan filed resolutions with 22 companies).
153 See id. at 4-8 (displaying the 1996 and 1997 charts, which reveal the shareholder
overlap).
15 Compare 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 7-10, with 1997 Shareholder
Report, supra note 52, at 4-6.
155 Currently, in order to resubmit a proposal that has been voted on in a prior year, one
must satisfy the "resubmission thresholds.' See supra note 116 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the current resubmission thresholds and the proposed amendment which would have
raised those threshold levels).
156 See supra Table 2 (indicating 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 figures of 11.8%, 11.10/,
10.4%, and 8.6%, respectively).
157 See supra note 116 and text accompanying note 118 (discussing the proposed
amendment to the resubmission thresholds and the fact that the amendment was never passed).
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B. Institutional Investors as the Faux Panacea
The 1990s marked the first time that institutional investors158 "con-
trolled more than half the shares in American corporations." 15 9 Such large
shareholdings make it difficult for these investors to follow the traditional
"Wall Street Rule." 160 This results from the theory that large blocks of
shares are relatively illiquid because an attempt to sell the block would send
a signal to the market, resulting in a drop in share price. 161 As long-term
investors, institutions have incentives to take active steps towards increasing
firm value. It is also worth noting that institutional investors can play a role
that independent directors' 62 cannot-that is, institutions "seem to have both
the incentive and the abilities to constrain management." 163 Thus, a number
of commentators throughout the 1980s and 1990s predicted that institutional
investors would carry the day and effect large-scale changes in corporate
governance through previously unseen activism. 164 After all, it is clear that
158 For purposes of this Comment, institutional investors will include "pension funds,
mutual funds, insurance companies, bank-managed funds, and charitable and educational en-
dowments, but not investment banks or savings and loans." Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447 n.3
(1991) (citation omitted).
K oppes, supra note 52, at B5. Koppes also notes that institutional investors "have
resisted sky-rocketing executive compensation packages." Id.
160 The Wall Street Rule states that shareholders will simply sell their holdings in a com-
pany with which they are unhappy. See Rock, supra note 158, at 462 (stating the Wall Street
Rule as "sell out if you dislike management"); Tobin, supra note 17, at 1730-31 (indicating
that according to the Wall Street Rule, investors would sell holdings if they were displeased
with a corporation's performance).
161 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Cor-
porate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288-89 (1991) (noting that as the size of the block
grows, institutional investors "must accept substantial price discounts in order to liquidate");
Rock, supra note 158, at 462 (same).
162 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYsIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04 (1994) (stating that independent directors are directors who have "no significant rela-
tionship with the corporation's senior executives").
163 Rock, supra note 158, at 449. The institutional investor has an incentive through its
economic stake in the company while the independent director generally lacks this incentive.
See id.
164 See Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 797-98 (noting that "recent amendments to the
Commission's proxy rules,'and increased activism by some of the nation's largest institutional
shareholders, might be a cause for mild optimism"); Palmiter, supra note 4, at 883 (indicating
that "[iun the late 1980s institutional shareholders brought Rule 14a-8 out of its quaint and
curious shell, employing the rule as a potent tool for corporate governance reform"); Kevin G.
Salwen, Institutions Are Poised to Increase Clout in Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992,
at BI ("Some commentators and many journalists are predicting that institutional investors are
poised to attack and that corporate management had best circle their wagons.").
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increasing the size of shareholding partially helps to solve the collective ac-
tion problem that has always faced shareholders.
165
Do institutional investors really have the incentives to constrain man-
agement? A number of factors conspire against the promise of institutional
investor activism, leading one author to state "that the new academic vision
of institutional investors liberating corporate governance and emancipating
shareholders from the tyranny of self-perpetuating corporate managers
is... a mirage."' 66 With respect to executive compensation issues, it seems
that this view has, in fact, carried the day.
Although institutional investors have displayed activism in other, less
controversial areas,167 they have not shown a concerted effort to tackle the
issue of executive compensation. To the contrary, with the exception of
proposals trying to link pay to performance, institutional investors have re-
cently demonstrated their lack of support by instituting blanket policies to
vote down shareholder proposals-specifically those dealing with executive
pay.168 Furthermore, proposals concerning executive pay declined from the
1994 to 1996 proxy seasons, and despite a surge in 1997, dropped back
down in 1998.169 Why the outright aversion to activism in this area?
One reason is the likelihood that institutional investors do not want to
become embroiled in such controversial issues with management, and, when
embroiled, would rather fight their battles behind the scenes than during
shareholder meetings. 17  There were also a number of more forceful argu-
165 See Rock, supra note 158, at 452 (noting that institutional shareholder activism is
made possible partly due to the gains realized through a reduction in the collective action
problem).
1 Coffee, supra note 130, at 843; see also Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It
Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 1009, 1011 (1994) .(wondering "whether institu-
tions possess the necessary expertise to monitor effectively, even if they are willing to moni-
tor" (citation omitted)). Professor Rock, in his seminal article in this field, also predicted that
despite potential gains in certain areas, an overall increase in institutional, shareholder activism
was unlikely. See Rock, supra note 158, at 453 ("Mhe optimists' vision of the institutional
investor as the shareholders' champion... will prove illusory.").
167 See Rock, supra note 158, at 481-84 & nn.134-53 (discussing institutional investor
support of shareholder proposals in a variety of contexts); id. at 451 (giving an example of a
proposal which has received support); see also id. at 449 (noting generally that "shareholder
proposals, particularly proposals by institutional shareholders, have received substantial
shareholder support" in the five-year period between 1985 and 1990).
168 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (noting the blanket voting rules
adopted by institutional investors).
169 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the three-year decline in pro-
posals).
No See Tobin, supra note 17, at 1729 (indicating that "institutional investors are focusing
their activism on corporate performance, primarily through pressure on boards"). Tobin also
notes that "[i]nstitutional shareholders, their advisors and members of the media aligned with
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ments put forth by academics in the early '90s about why institutional in-
vestors might not be able to effectively monitor corporations. Among these
were arguments about the increasing agency costs associated with activ-
ism, preferences for liquidity, 17 collective action problems, a lack of
positive incentives, 174 and conflicts of interest. 17 Although the other factors
are not irrelevant to this analysis, it is the variety of conflicts of interest that
likely accounts for the institutional investors' inability to remedy (or even
address) the problem of executive compensation. If any conflicts of interest
truly do exist between institutional investors and the corporations in which
they own equity, there is a strong argument that this is precisely where one
would expect to see them.
A few examples aptly demonstrate how these conflicts of interest de-
stroy any ability that institutional investors may have to effect changes in
executive compensation through shareholder proposals. First, it is recog-
nized that "opposing management in proxy issues can damage the relation-
ships between institutional investors and management." 176 Also, banks and
insurance companies have historically been the least willing types of insti-
tutional investor to oppose management due to a fear of retaliation.1 77 Be-
cause many banks and insurance companies also have business relationships
with the companies that they invest in, they are justifiably wary of upsetting
those relationships. Money managers are also in constant competition for
new accounts and may not be able to overcome a reputation of being "ac-
tive" managers, especially ones who support limits on executive compensa-
tion.178 Finally, in a world where passive investment strategies 179 dominate
institutional shareholders are the most active source of current pressure on directors to shift
focus to issues of general corporate performance." Id at 1730.
171 See, e.g., Rock, supra note 158, at 464-78 (providing an in-depth analysis of the
agencY costs associated with institutional shareholder activism).
2 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 161, at 1318-21 (describing how some institutions' need
for liquidity may quell activism).
173 See, e.g., id. at 1280 n.8 (suggesting that collective action problems "de-
serve.., weight in any theory of institutional investor behavior").
174 See, e.g., Rock, supra note 158, at 472 (asking "whether money managers have suffi-
cient1uositive incentives to act in shareholders' interest").5 See Black, supra note 14, at 524 (recognizing that conflicts of interest play a signifi-
cant role for companies); Coffee, supra note 161, at 1321-22 (noting a variety of ways in
which institutional investors face conflicts of interest); Rock, supra note 158, at 469-72
(same).
176 Rock, supra note 158, at 471 n.83.
177 See Coffee, supra note 161, at 1321 (noting the "fear that their firn will lose busi-
ness ... if the investor is perceived as an 'activist').
178 See id. at 1322 (recognizing the fear of reputational damage).
179 For simplicity, the definition of a passive strategy is "one that invests only in index
funds and weights those funds in fixed proportions that do not change in response to market
conditions." BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 567. This finance textbook gives as its standard
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many large funds, "the principal way to improve performance is to cut
costs.' '18 Any activism by the fund manager will only increase costs and
thereby reduce returns to investors. These four simple conflicts make clear
why it is probably not in an institutional investor's best interests to attack
management on the executive compensation front.
In addition to conflicts of interest, there is one further reason why in-
stitutional shareholders logically would be hesitant to try to correct compen-
sation abuses. Executive compensation makes up such a small percentage
of a firm's assets that even excessive pay packages likely will not cause a
blip in a firm's stock value.13 1 As one scholar noted, "Acceding to exces-
sive compensation is one way to keep on managers' good side without
hurting the value of the shareholders' stock portfolio.' 82 Professor Skeel
perceptively contrasts the issue of executive compensation with that of
takeovers, where "institutional shareholders cannot afford to cater to man-
agers' desire for protection because the effect on stock price is so great."'
83
This salient justification for a lack of concern (that is, that there is no effect
on stock value), coupled with serious conflicts of interest that actually
weigh against activism, could account for the lack of serious attention paid
to this issue by institutional investors. In sum, although institutional inves-
tors clearly have the capability to induce change in this area, their reluctance
has left the onus on individual shareholders, who continue to be the most
active in putting forth proposals.18
4
C. Arguments Against Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy
Most writing throughout the last two decades has focused on increasing
shareholder access to the proxy.18 5 As an argument in favor of generally in-
passive strategy one that always puts 60% of its funds in a stock market index fund, 30% in a
bond index fund, and 10% in a money market fund. See id
180 Rock, supra note 158, at 474.
181 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1875 (noting the insignificance of CEO compensation to
corporate treasuries); see also E-mail from David Skeel, Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, to Lori Marino (Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with author).
183 E-mail from David Skeel, supra note 181.
183 Id.
184 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (recognizing that individual share-
holders have put forth the vast majority of proposals).
185 Each of the following authors has put forward an argument for increasing shareholder
access to the proxy. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 1139 (arguing that "the SEC has affirmatively
impeded the effectiveness of the shareholder voting process both through its adoption of rules
that interfere with shareholder democracy and through its failure to adopt rules to address de-
ficiencies in the process"); Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 795-800 (arguing that if shareholders
had meaningful access to the proxy, then they could use this power to ensure an independent
board of directors, but that free rider and other coordination problems usually doom proposals
not supported by management); Palmiter, supra note 4, at 880 (arguing, inter alia, that "Rule
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creasing shareholder access to the proxy, one author suggested that "[t]o the
extent that shareholders are sufficiently concerned with ordinary business
matters to draft a shareholder proposal in conformity with the [procedural
requirements of the] proxy rules, a corporation should include such a pro-
posal in the proxy materials."' 8 6 The SEC's view, however, has been much
more tempered. While arguably increasing shareholder access to the proxy
in various ways over the last few decades, overall, it appears that the SEC
remains committed to the substantive and procedural burdens placed upon
shareholders desiring to offer proposals.
There are also many commentators who, for a variety of reasons, are
opposed to giving shareholders increased access to the proxy. 8 7 In the area
of executive compensation, very few would argue with the statement that
shareholder access to the proxy was dramatically increased in 1992-and
what was given to shareholders then has not been taken away since that
time. Yet, there was still a decline in the overall number of executive pay
proposals submitted from 1994 to 1996.188 One cannot argue that the ef-
fects of these changes are simply unrealized because enough time has not
passed to see the fruits of these changes. As of 1994, shareholders had al-
most two full proxy seasons to adjust to the new disclosure rules and
changes in SEC policy. Still, the fact remains that the numbers of proposals
in the area of executive compensation remain at surprisingly low levels.
189
14a-8's regulation of the merits of shareholder communications ... disserves the rule's valu-
able purposes and is at odds with the spirit of the agency's recent moves to facilitate share-
holder communications").
186 Goforth, supra note 3, at 459-60. This suggestion clearly goes too far and at first
glance strikes me as analogous to the following: to the extent that I am willing to take the
time and go through the trouble and expense of filling out 50 lottery tickets in the correct
manner (making sure that all the circles are completely filled in), I should win the $1 million
prize. The statement makes more logical sense when taken as a comment on the difficulty of
complying with all of the SEC's complicated procedural rules.
Uee, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 289 (1980) (asserting that separation of ownership and control is efficient); Wil-
liam J. Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAW. 621, 640 (1976) (remark-
ing that too few shareholders participate in the process); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982) (criticizing generally the movement
towards increased shareholder access); Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance and
the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 175-78 (1981) (arguing that shareholders have no incen-
tive to monitor corporations' actions because they are only holders of investments); Henry G.
Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1440-41 (1964)
(arguing that shareholder opportunities for participation in corporate governance are wasted
because the costs outweigh the benefits in these types of endeavors).
188 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting a decline in shareholder proposals
regarding executive pay in 1996, marking the third consecutive year of such declines).
189 See supra Table 2 (noting the total number of executive compensation-related propos-
als).
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With results like this, it makes one wonder why the SEC continues to
go through the trouble of studying shareholder preferences and tinkering
with the federal proxy rules.190 It also lends credence to a number of the ar-
guments made in favor of restricting access to the proxy.191 How long must
the pattern of perceived shareholder apathy to this and other issues continue
before the advocates of increasing shareholder access to the proxy-as a
means of correcting compensation abuses-realize that their efforts are
misplaced?
IV. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. The Status of Delaware Law
Shareholders have a right to bring their complaints about excessive
compensation to court in the form of shareholder derivative suits. Lawsuits
often allege one or more of the following: "that the board acted carelessly
or was not fully informed; that the board had a conflict of interest ... ; that
the proxy materials. .. were incomplete or misleading; and that the com-
pensation awarded.., constitutes a waste of corporate assets." '192 The Su-
preme Court first authorized lower courts to hear shareholder challenges to
excessive compensation earlier this century in Rogers v. Hill.193 This case
still has a place in the Delaware courts.194 Delaware courts rely on Rogers
for the principle that "compensation payments may grow so large that they
are unconscionable." 195 Thus, even though courts today may hesitate to at-
tack the substance of a compensation package, they do so in the face of a
Supreme Court mandate that recognizes that there is still a point at which
the pay level is too high, regardless of the process used to arrive at the pack-
age. I have chosen Delaware as the focus of this judicial inquiry because it
is well recognized that Delaware has both the most highly developed corpo-
190 The obvious answer is that it gives the SEC something to do. See supra text accom-
panying note 123 (quoting the SEC Final Rule and illustrating how the SEC is essentially
propagating its own existence in promulgating changes to the proxy rules).
19, The purpose of this Comment, however, is not to argue that the SEC should restrict
access to the proxy in any way.
192 Paul K. Rowe, Defending Executive Compensation in the Courts: Substance and
Strategy, 6 INSIGHTS 12, 12 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 6 No. 4 Insights 12.
193 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) (holding that an equitable inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of executive compensation may be justified in cases of possible "spoilation or waste of
corporate property").
194 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.11, at 4-251 (2d ed. 1993) (indicating
that Rogers still has vitality in Delaware).
195 Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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rate case law as well as the incorporation of the largest percentage of the
nation's large corporations.
196
Decisions since Rogers have produced a variety of unclear and poorly
articulated tests that turn on whether a given compensation package was ap-
proved by a disinterested board with a majority of outside directors, ratified
by a majority of disinterested shareholders, both, or neither. This makes
summarizing the law in the area of executive compensation
difficult at times because existing doctrines and analyses often lack rational
analysis. For example, the exact relationship between the directors' duty of
care and the business judgment rule has never been successfully explained in
any generally acceptable fashion. Nor have the exact relationships between the
duty of care, the business judgment rule and the doctrine of "corporate waste"
been clarified.
197
This difficulty becomes apparent as soon as one tries to put together a
cohesive analysis of judicial opinions in this area. A few things, however,
are clear. First, Delaware law expressly authorizes the board of directors to
determine executive compensation. 198 Second, the board of directors gener-
ally delegates the task of determining executive pay to a compensation
committee. 199  Finally, the compensation decision, whether made by the
board of directors or the compensation committee, is generally afforded the
protection of the business judgment rule.200 The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware described the business judgment rule as a rebuttable presumption, and
defined it as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
196 See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 9 n.26 (1993)
(noting Delaware's stature as a state of incorporation and its well-developed corporate law);
see also Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 787 ("[More than fifty percent of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in the State of Delaware [and] its corporate code is a prime source
for what state law provides with respect to corporate governance.").
197 Michael, supra note 37, at 802-03 (footnotes omitted).
198 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (1991) (authorizing corporations to appoint offi-
cers and agents and pay them suitable compensation). This authorization comes from the
general delegation of power to the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) ("The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors ... :"). Courts have recognized, under section 141(a), that
"[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that direc-
tors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.' Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
199 See Michael, supra note 37, at 802 ("In most large corporations, th[e] decision [about
executive pay] is delegated by the board to a compensation committee.").
200 See id. at 803 ("As with all decisions by the board of directors and its committees, the
protection of the business judgment rule nominally extends to executive compensation deci-
sions as well.").
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belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. ' 20 1 The
Delaware Supreme Court applied this rule in the early case of Beard v. El-
ster to preclude itself from substituting its own "uninformed opinion for that
of experienced business managers. '202 Because the rule protects business
decisions to such a degree as to render meaningless any scrutiny given to
the decision, the rule recently has been used to effectively insulate business
decisions from judicial review.
2 °3
There are a number of instances when the business judgment rule is not
used, or, from the plaintiff-shareholder's perspective, when a meaningless
level of scrutiny can be evaded. When a director of a Delaware corporation
is essentially on both sides of the bargaining table, thereby raising the spec-
ter of self-dealing, the test is different: in these cases, the director has the
burden of proving the "entire fairness" of the transaction.20 4 However, di-
rectors can often avoid the heightened scrutiny that comes with a fairness
review simply by delegating the task of determining executive pay to a
compensation committee comprised of independent directors.
Another means of avoiding the meaningless scrutiny provided under the
business judgment rule is to allege facts sufficient to prove that the compen-
sation is so excessive as to constitute waste. This was the argument made in
Rogers, where the Supreme Court focused on the size of the compensation
in determining that an investigation was warranted. 20 5 It is significant that
the Rogers Court focused on the size of the compensation, rather than the
process used to arrive at the compensation. Recently, however, the focus
has shifted to an inquiry into the procedures used to authorize and ratify ex-
ecutive compensation packages.20 6 This indicates a shift away from sub-
stantive judicial review of executive compensation packages. The concept
of waste will be developed more fully in the next Subpart.
201 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
202 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960). The Beard case concerns compensation and thus is
directly relevant to the analysis that follows.
203See Bogus, supra note 12, at 64 (noting that "the business judgment rule erects insur-
mountable obstacles to realistic challenges of any board decision").
204 See Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (discussing the aspects
of the entire fairness test and its two basic components, fair dealing and fair price); Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (observing that directors dealing with them-
selves "constitutes self-dealing that would ordinarily require that the directors prove that the
grants involved were, in the circumstances, entirely fair to the corporation").
205 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (stating that the compensation was "so large
as to warrant investigation in equity").
206 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 337-38 (noting the focus on procedures).
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B. Vogelstein and the Analysis of Waste
The plaintiff shareholders in Lewis v. Vogelstein alleged that the exces-
sive compensation offered to the directors of Mattel in the form of a stock
option plan amounted to waste." 7 The stock option compensation plan had
been ratified by the shareholders of the company.208 Chancellor Allen noted
in the Vogelstein decision that "informed, uncoerced, disinterested share-
holder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have a mate-
rial conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from judi-
cial review except on the basis of waste."20 9 In other words, shareholder
ratification protects directors against all claims except one of waste, even in
a situation where the directors have a clear conflict of interest. Thus, even
though a transaction involving self-dealing ordinarily requires an entire
fairness inquiry,2 10 Chancellor Allen had to articulate a waste standard.
When waste is alleged, a less-than-unanimous shareholder ratification is not
a complete defense. In determining what effect the less-than-unanimous
212shareholder ratification had on the transaction, Allen saw four possibili-
ties. Effective shareholder ratification could:
(1) act as a complete defense to any allegations of breach of duty;
(2) change the judicial inquiry from one of fairness (because this was a
self-interested transaction) to one of waste;
(3) shift the burden of proof of unfairness to the plaintiff shareholder;
or
(4) have no effect on the analysis.
213
Note that the four options cover a wide range of possibilities--option
one completely insulates the compensation decision, while option four does
not give any credence to the ratification at all. There are cases in Delaware
jurisprudence supporting each of the possible conclusions except the
fourth. 4  In analyzing the effects of shareholder ratification, Chancellor
207 See id. at 329-30 for a detailed description of the facts of the case.
208 See id. at 329.
209 Id. at 336.
210 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing the entire fairness test).
211 See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219 (Del. 1979) ("It is only where a claim of
gift or waste of assets, fraud or ultra vires is asserted that a less than unanimous shareholder
ratification is not a full defense.").
212 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 333-34 ("The question then becomes what is the effect of
informed shareholder ratification on a transaction of this type ... ).
213 See id. at 334 (indicating the four possible effects of informed shareholder ratifica-
tion).
214 See id. at 334 n.10 (citing, for example, In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 663
A.2d 1194, 1204-05 (Del. Ch. 1995), which held that effective shareholder ratification acts as
a complete defense for a breach of duty of care (effect one); Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224,
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Allen recognized the differences between shareholder ratification of an ac-
tion by a director and the classic examples of ratification by a single princi-
pal.21' He also noted three factors that complicate the application of general
ratification principles to shareholder ratification 16 and seemingly acknowl-
edged that shareholder votes on issues like this should be accorded little
weight.
Chancellor Allen then proceeded to an analysis of the history of Dela-
ware law dealing with stock option plans that were ratified by shareholders.
He found support for the proposition that informed shareholder ratification
validates a grant unless there is waste (effect two above).217  He found,
however, that the waste standard articulated in earlier cases was "not a
waste standard at all, but was a form of 'reasonableness' or proportionality
review."218 In the early cases, stock option grants (even those with share-
holder ratification) had to satisfy a two-part test: (1) the company had to
receive "sufficient consideration" 219 and (2) the plan had to assure that the
consideration would pass to the company. 22  Chancellor Allen correctly
read this weighing of reasonableness to be more heightened than the scru-
tiny ordinarily associated with a waste standard, and thus easier to satisfy.
221
Chancellor Allen concluded, however, that the tests employed by earlier
which held that effective ratification triggers a waste standard (effect two); and Citron v. EL
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990), which held that effective
ratification shifts the burden of proof of unfairness to the plaintiff (effect three)).
215 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 335 (noting that these differences "lead to a difference in
the effect of a valid ratification").
216 See id. The first problem was that the "principal" in this transaction was an aggregate
of individuals and thus ratification decisions were subject to traditional collective action
problems. See id. Second, ratification was not occurring here in the traditional sense, to con-
fer legal authority, but rather it was to affirm that an action taken was truly in the best interests
of the shareholders. See id. Finally, ratifying a director conflict transaction was affected by
related statutory law, Delaware General Corporation Law section 144. See id.
217 See, e.g., Michelson, 407 A.2d at 218-19 (explaining that acts that amount to a "waste
of corporate assets" are not "susceptible to cure by shareholder approval"); Beard v. Elster,
160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) (stating that shareholder ratification of a stock option plan is
not sufficient to cure the transaction if there is not "a reasonable relationship between the
value of the benefits passing to the corporation and the value of the options granted").
218 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336.
219 Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952). The "sufficient
consideration" prong of the test was also expressed as requiring a "reasonable relationship
between the value of the services... and the value of the [stock] options." Id.
220 See id. (stating that "[c]ircumstances [must exist] which may be expected to insure
that the contemplated consideration will in fact pass to the corporation").
221 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 337 (concluding that the two-part test is a "form of
heightened scrutiny that is now sometimes referred to as an intermediate or proportionality
review").
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Delaware courts in the context of executive compensation were problematic,
largely because it is difficult to value stock option grants.
222
So, Chancellor Allen went back to the case law to find support for a
stricter waste standard. He found it first in Beard v. Elster, ' I a 1960 deci-
sion of the Delaware Supreme Court, and then more persuasively in Michel-
son v. Duncan,224 a 1979 decision of the same court. Allen therefore
adopted the "classic waste standard": "If... there is any substantial con-
sideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faithf judgment
that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no
finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex post that the
transaction was unreasonably risky."225 He did this while recognizing the
collective action problems that face shareholders and the potential illegiti-
macies of shareholder ratification. He dismissed any notion of "fairmess" or
analysis of the sufficiency of consideration outright, stating that these judi-
cial techniques seem useful principally "to those unfamiliar with the limita-
tions of courts and their litigation processes." 226 He relied heavily on the
fact that the court in Michelson did not analyze the sufficiency of consid-
eration given to the company; the court simply looked to see if there was
any at all. 2 ' Finally, Chancellor Allen believed that the classic waste stan-
dard which he adopted at least afforded protection against what he termed
"egregious cases or 'constructive fraud.', 221
In trying to come up with support for a stricter waste standard, Chan-
cellor Allen ignored the fact that in Michelson, the court was bound by a
state statute that provided that in the absence of fraud, the judgment of the
directors as to the consideration and the sufficiency of that consideration is
conclusive.229 In fact, in light of the statute, the plaintiff in Michelson had
222 See id. ("Valuing an option grant (as part of a reasonable relationship test) is quite
difficult ... "). Chancellor Allen also notes that "[e]ven more problematic is valuing... the
future benefits that the corporation hopes to obtain from the option grant." Id.
2 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) (stating that the company must "reasonably expect to
receive the contemplated benefit" and that "there must be a reasonable relationship between
the value" to the corporation and the value to the executive).
224 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979) (stating that the essence of a claim of gift or a claim of
waste is a lack of consideration).
M Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336; see also Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch.
1962)(articulating the same waste standard).
226 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 338.
7 See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224 (stating that the issue was whether there was no con-
sideration, not inadequate consideration, and recognizing the difference between the two
claims).
2V Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 338.
229 See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 222-23 n.4 (quoting the relevant statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 157(a) (1991), which states that "[i]n the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and
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to claim that there was no consideration at all, because there was no allega-
tion of fraud. The court noted that "[i]mplicit in that section is the existence
of some consideration, and assuming that fact begs the question at issue."
230
The court expressly left open the issue of whether the statute would bar a
claim of inadequacy of consideration-an issue it did not have to resolve.
231
Chancellor Allen might have misread the Michelson decision in an-
other, more meaningful, way. He read Michelson as offering support for the
proposition that informed shareholder ratification shifts the inquiry from
one of fairness to one of waste (effect two above).232 However, the Michel-
son court clearly held that "shareholder ratification shifted the burden of
proof of want or inadequacy of consideration for the grant of the options
from defendants to plaintiff.,233 The court also noted that ordinarily the
burden would be on the self-interested directors to prove that there was a
"fair exchange," but shareholder ratification shifts the burden of proving a
lack of fair exchange to the plaintiff shareholder.234  These are verbatim
adoptions of the third effect of shareholder ratification stated above.
235
Thus, Chancellor Allen's reading has the effect of giving shareholder ratifi-
cation more deference, while Michelson arguably militates for less.
Chancellor Allen's reading of Beard is also problematic. Allen stated
that the court in Beard "relaxed slightly the general formulation" of the two-
prong test for waste by rejecting the notion that the corporation needed as-
surance of consideration in order to validate a grant.236 The Beard court,
however, clearly adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny used by its
predecessor courts in requiring the corporation to "reasonably expect to re-
ceive the contemplated benefit from the grant of options"; and also in re-
the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive"). Chancellor Allen interpreted the multiple refer-
ences to "waste" made in Michelson to mean plainly "the absence of any consideration." Vo-
gelstein, 699 A.2d at 338.
230 Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224 (emphasis added).
231 See id. ("Whether or not [Delaware General Corporation Law section] 157 disposes of
an inadequacy of consideration claim is not the issue before us.").
232 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 334 n.10 (noting that Michelson supports effect two). For
a discussion of the potential effects of shareholder ratification, see supra text accompanying
note 213.
233 Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224.
234 Id. (citing Kaufhian v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 791 (Del. Ch. 1952)). "Where there
has been independent stockholder ratification of interested director action, the objecting
shareholder has the burden of showing that no person of ordinary sound business judgment
would say that the consideration received for the options was a fair exchange for the options
granted." Id.
235 See supra text accompanying note 213 (stating that the third possible effect of in-
formed shareholder ratification is to shift the burden of proof of unfairness to the plaintiff
shareholder).
236 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 337.
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quiring "a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefit passing
to the corporation and the value of the options granted. '23 7 Therefore, al-
though Beard arguably moved us toward a slightly stricter standard of
waste, it clearly did not deviate from the "reasonableness" test employed by
preceding courts.
There are a few other interesting points about Chancellor Allen's deci-
sion in Vogelstein. First, he clearly recognized that the "Supreme Court [of
Delaware] has not expressly deviated from the 'proportionality' approach to
waste of its earlier decision."2 38 Also, Chancellor Allen clings to the belief
that shareholder assent is a better way to monitor compensation abuse than
judicial attempts at parsing through the fairness or the sufficiency of a given
level of consideration2 39 At bottom, he does not want to look at the com-
pensation package itself and determine whether it is excessive; rather, he
would prefer to focus on the independence of the process used to arrive at
that compensation package. This departs from courts past and present,
which have not found an analysis of the substance of a compensation pack-
age to be so problematic. 4 Finally, despite his feelings on the issue, Chan-
cellor Allen still heeds the Michelson court's advice that the case law "indi-
cate[s] a strong disfavor for summary judgment in stock option claims
where waste of corporate assets is alleged."2 4 1 Although arguing for a
stricter waste standard that effectively would preclude substantive judicial
review-stating that the judiciary is not the proper body to make these deci-
sions and summarily dismissing those who think that it is--Chancellor Al-
len recognizes that inquiries into waste are "inherently factual and not easily
amenable to determination on a motion to dismiss [or] ... a motion for
summary judgment."2 42 Thus, despite all the rhetoric, the plaintiff's action
in Vogelstein survived a motion to dismiss.
The effect of such a strict definition of waste became clear in a few re-
cent cases dealing with executive compensation packages that were chal-
lenged as waste. Zupnick v. Goizueta,243 a shareholder suit attacking a stock
237 Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960).
238 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 338.
239 See id. ("[A]ssent is... a more rational means to monitor compensation than judicial
determinations of the 'fairness,' or sufficiency of consideration......).
240 See, e.g., Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1994) (formulating a
number of factors that could be relevant to a determination of waste); Lewis v. Aronson, 466
A.2d 375, 384 (Del. Ch. 1983) (focusing on the compensation package itself), rev'd on other
grounds, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch.
1962) (discussing factors to weigh); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656
(Del. 1952) (requiring an analysis of "sufficient consideration").
241 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211,223 (Del. 1979).
242 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 339.
243 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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option grant to Coca-Cola CEO Roberto Goizueta, was decided two months
before Vogelstein. In Goizueta, the court restated the definition of waste set
out in Michelson that is used in cases where there has been shareholder rati-
fication: "[T]he complaint must support the conclusion that 'no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would say that the consideration re-
ceived for the options was a fair exchange for the options granted.' ' '244 The
court recognized the near impossibility of satisfying such an extreme test.245
The court dismissed the case for failure to state a legally cognizable claim
for waste before ever reaching the merits.
2 4 6
An even more extreme result was reached in recent litigation involving
The Walt Disney Company and the severance package given to fourteen-
month President Michael Ovitz.2 47 Among other things, Disney's employ-
ment contract with Ovitz contained a no-fault provision, which provided
that three million of Ovitz's stock options would vest immediately upon a
departure based upon this provision. 24  Apparently, the value of this grant
was never calculated for the board of directors prior to voting on the com-
pensation package. 249 Of course, Ovitz departed from Disney a mere four-
teen months after he was hired, amidst rumors of his inability to handle the
job effectively. The plaintiff-shareholders sued Disney claiming, among
other things, waste. By the court's admission, the severance package totaled
$140 million. Yet, the court proceeded to attempt to minimize not only
the figure itself, but the type of decision that the board made:
A corporate board's extraordinary decision to award a $140 million severance
package [is] governed by the same corporate law principles as its everyday de-
cision to authorize a loan.... Nature does not sink a ship merely because of
its size, and neither do courts overrule a board's decision to approve and later
honor a severance package, merely because of its size.
251
244 Id. at 387 (quoting Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224); see also Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91
A.2d 786, 791 (Del. Ch. 1952) (stating the same rule).
245 See Goizueta, 698 A.2d at 387 (noting that .'if under the circumstances any reason-
able person might conclude that the deal made sense, then the judicial inquiry ends' (quoting
Steiner v. Meyerson, C.A. No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95 (July 18, 1995))).
246 See id. at 389. The court also dismissed the case under Delaware Chancery Court
Rule 23.1, finding that the shareholder was not excused from demanding action by the board
of directors pre-suit. See id.
247 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing the furor created by the
severance package given to Ovitz).
248 See In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 1998 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 186, at *9 (Oct. 7, 1998) (providing details of the no-fault provision).
249 See id. at *41-42 (indicating that Graef Crystal, the expert who advised the board,
admitted to never quantifying the total cost of the package).
250 See id. at *2.
251 Id. at *2-3.
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Does this reasoning make logical sense? Does it contradict the Supreme
Court's decision in Rogers v. Hill?
The court in Walt Disney took a particularly stringent view of waste.
The standard adopted holds directors liable only when they "'authorize an
exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound
judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consid-
eration."' 252 The court did not discuss the various waste standards put forth
by previous courts, as Chancellor Allen did in Vogelstein, nor did the court
acknowledge the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court still has not de-
parted from the proportionality review of earlier jurisprudence. 253 Finally,
and most critical to the decision, the Walt Disney court, like the Goizueta
court, ignored the factual nature of the dispute and the warnings of Michel-
son and dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment. 4
C. A Modest Proposal for Reform
In light of the removal of some of the clearest regulatory obstacles to
shareholder activism in 1992, one would have expected to see an increase in
activism in the last seven years. Particularly, one would expect to see a rise
in proposals concerning executive compensation, which has been a prime
target for criticism in recent years. Removing a few regulatory obstacles to
shareholder activism in 1992, however, did not solve the problem of exces-
sive executive compensation. Rather, shareholder proposals have not risen
at all-they actually have remained relatively flat and at a low level. 255 In
addition, executive compensation has not decreased, nor has it even re-
mained at the same level from year to year.256 Regardless of enhanced dis-
closure and shareholders' increased ability to put forth proposals relating to
executive compensation, pay levels continue to rise at unabated levels. The
figures suggest that altering the federal proxy rules to give shareholders in-
creased access to the proxy will not remedy the situation.
This Comment argues that compensation critics have missed the mark
by attacking the SEC and the federal proxy rules. Shareholder proposals
are, at best, an indirect way of correcting compensation abuses-they are
still only advisory, and generally have very little success in winning a ma-
jority of the shareholders' votes. There are real impediments to shareholder
252 Id. at *43 (quoting Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993)).
253 See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing Chancellor Allen's recognition
of the Supreme Court of Delaware's position on the standard of review for waste).
254 See In re Walt Disney, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 186, at * 101-02 (dismissing the claims).
255 See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (tracking the numbers of shareholder
proposals on executive compensation).
256 See supra Part I (giving a brief history of executive compensation issues).
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action at the ballot box, impediments that should not be overlooked when
searching for a remedy.5 7 Further, there is clearly something about execu-
tive compensation proposals in particular that make them unappealing tar-
gets for shareholder proposals or support. Critics, then, must turn to other
avenues to solve the problem of executive overcompensation.
Despite the SEC's insistence that shareholders use the ballot box in-
stead of resorting to the courts for relief, this Comment argues that share-
holders should seek judicial relief. Further, due to the inherent conflicts
present in the area of executive compensation, Delaware courts should lead
the state courts in a general return to a heightened level of scrutiny when
dealing with executive compensation transactions. The proposal that this
Comment sets forth has two prongs. First, compensation packages that have
not been ratified by a disinterested and independent compensation commit-
tee or by the shareholders of the company should warrant a broad judicial
inquiry and be given strict scrutiny. This level of scrutiny makes sense
when one recognizes that Delaware courts treat approvals from these com-
mittees as very important. The second prong of the proposal provides for
the situation where there is disinterested approval of a compensation plan.
In these situations, courts should analyze a pay package under a "reason-
ableness" review. Note that this proposal arguably does not reflect a dra-
matic change in Delaware law.259
Despite the Chancery Court's recent resistance to substantive reviews
of the executive compensation packages in Vogelstein, Goizueta, and Walt
Disney, there is support in Delaware case law for a "reasonableness" review
of challenged transactions. The courts should return to the two-pronged test
articulated in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.:260
The validity of a [compensation] plan... depends directly upon the existence
of consideration to the corporation and the inclusion in the plan of conditions,
or the existence of circumstances which may be expected to insure that the
contemplated consideration will in fact pass to the corporation.... Sufficient
consideration... [requires] a reasonable relationship between the value of the
257 See Bogus, supra note 12, at 41, for a discussion of some of the most salient impedi-
ments facing shareholders.
258 See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992).
259 See discussion supra notes 229-42 and accompanying text (discussing problems
raised by Vogelstein, Michelson, and Beard, and suggesting that proportional review remains
Delaware's standard in these types of cases). This proposal is similar, but more specific, than
the recommendations of Professor Yablon in his 1992 article dealing with this issue. Our rea-
sons for suggesting this type of proposal also differ. See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1897-906.
260 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952).
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services to be rendered by the employee and the value... grantedS261
as... compensation.
Delaware courts can rely not only on the case law that supports this type of
proportional review, but also on the large body of literature that continues to
develop detailing the excessiveness of executive compensation and the in-
ability of shareholder ratification procedures, disinterested boards, or com-
pensation committees to deal with the problem.
262
Courts like the Vogelstein court can find answers to the elusive question
"What is excessive?" by relying on objective principles (not subjective
linedrawing), if they simply look for them. Further, valuation is not as
problematic as Chancellor Allen would have us think. In most cases, an ex-
plicit valuation of the pay package would not be necessary, because the
posture of a case would generally be one where the compensation plan had
been adopted, but not yet implemented. In cases where the compensation
had already been paid, a number of useful factors could be considered, "the
most frequently mentioned being compensation of similar executives in
other companies in the same industry, the success of the company as deter-
mined by various financial measures, the ability and performance of the ex-
ecutive, and the absolute size of the payments." 263  Regardless of the
method chosen for valuation or the factors considered, this type of valuation
intuitively strikes one as easier than, for instance, valuing a firm for ap-
praisal purposes, which courts often unhesitatingly do.264 As one academic
accurately noted, "if it is not possible to state objectively how much a par-
ticular individual should be paid, it is often possible to declare that an indi-
vidual has been paid too much. 265
261 Id. at 656.
262 See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 12, at 47 (arguing, inter alia, that judicial remedies are
necessary to curb excessive executive compensation); Michael, supra note 37, at 788-95 (de-
scribing the current and historical outrage over excessive executive compensation in the con-
text of the case law and the duties of corporate officers); Seligman, supra note 196, at 9 (ob-
serving the facility with which a CEO's compensation can be raised as a result of the decline
of state law duties of loyalty); Melvin A. Eisenberg, A Brief Overview of the Problems Raised
by Executive and Director Compensation, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 299, Dec. 11, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, SC53 ALI-ABA 299 (providing a survey of common complaints
conceming excessive executive compensation for CEOs of publicly held corporations).
263 Michael, supra note 37, at 809-10 (footnotes omitted).
264 1 owe thanks to Professor Skeel for pointing out this line of thinking with respect to
valuation. See E-mail from David Skeel, supra note 181.
265 Bogus, supra note 12, at 27.
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CONCLUSION
This Comment suggests that the emphasis on reforming the federal
proxy rules in order to curb excessive compensation levels has been mis-
guided. Were the federal proxy rules truly the holy grail, then the SEC's
repeated efforts at amending them to increase access to the proxy should
have enabled shareholders to effect some change. This has not been the
case-the numbers largely speak for themselves. This Comment proposes
that critics of the system reexamine the focus given to the proxy rules and
divert their attention away from a solution that has proven itself incapable of
solving the problem. Shareholders who are dissatisfied with the excessive
compensation packages bestowed upon corporate executives must take their
claims to state court. State courts should recognize the limited avenues of
relief open to shareholders and the conflicts of interest inherent in compen-
sation decisions, and once again substantively review compensation deci-
sions.
* * * * * *
